Introduction
This paper presents the preliminary outline of a new interpretation
of the events in Indonesia in 1965 that climaxed in the "coup"
attempt of October 1st and the actions of the September 30th Movement
(GESTAPU). It is argued that the September 30th Movement was not an
action by "progressive" or dissatisfied middle-level military officers,
nor a creature of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), nor was it
stimulated by President Sukarno. GESTAPU was an instrument directly
in the hands of General Suharto (and probably General Nasution) [1995 note
from David Johnson: today I would delete the reference to Nasution] and
most likely a creation of the Central Intelligence Agency for the
purpose of "saving Indonesia from Communism" in a desperate situation.
GESTAPU served the crucial function of providing a legitimate pretext
for the drastic extermination of the PKI. It was calculated to put the
reins of power quickly into the hands of Suharto and to place Sukarno
in a restricted position.
GESTAPU worked. It is probably the most successful covert
operation that the CIA has ever carried out. The participation of the
CIA in GESTAPU--its "fingerprints on the gun"--cannot be proven unless
the Congress digs hard to find the truth, as was done partly in
the case of Chile. The CIA connection is hypothesized because it seems
a logical outcome of U.S. policy toward Indonesia and because of
the relative sophistication and complexity of the GESTAPU operation.
Because of the close contact between the Indonesian Army and U.S.
Defense Department advisers and attaches it is probable that certain
of these personnel were also involved.
It is not maintained that the thesis of this paper is necessarily
correct or proven. The author's hope is to demonstrate that it is
sufficiently plausible that further research along these lines will
be conducted by those more knowledgeable than he and that those in a
position to do something about it will begin to look into the secret
official record. The thesis is presented without a great deal of
hedging but the author is aware that many of the facts he uses are
open to a number of alternative explanations. Of course, many "facts"
are in dispute. This first draft assumes some knowledge on the part
of the reader of the basic events of the time and of the existing
interpretive controversy. No special attempt is made here, however,
to refute alternative theories. Only a portion of the supporting material
is indicated.
The events of October 1, 1965, in Indonesia and their origin
may truly be called "a riddle wrapped in an enigma.~ There is no consensus
among students of Indonesia about the "correct" explanation. All existing
theories have their articulate and plausible critics. Probably the
majority of careful Indonesian scholars have abandoned the search for
explanation. GESTAPU is an enormously complicated puzzle in which the
pieces never fit together, their shape constantly changes, and new
pieces keep appearing.
In an earlier age of innocence, the attributing to the CIA of a
significant causal role in international affairs was a disreputable
enterprise in which most professional analysts seldom engaged. With
the revelations of recent years, however, the inhibitions on serious
study of CIA activities have somewhat broken down. We also know far
more than we did ten years ago about the extent of CIA operations
and how the CIA works. In many cases, including Indonesia, we still
know very little about what the CIA actually did over the years. But
more than before we can feel on safe ground to think that the CIA was
active. This is not CIA scapegoating, left-wing propaganda, conspiracy
fascination, or a search for simple-minded solutions. It is a necessary
and important research effort that must be undertaken before it can
be seriously rejected. Of course, the great secrecy that envelops the
subject places substantial restrictions on what normal academic
research can accomplish.
This paper is based in the first instance on the author's
reading of the recently released CIA Research Study "Indonesia-1965: The
Coup That Backfired." The author has also read nearly everything
available in English in the Library of Congress on the events of 1965.
The major source material that has not been examined, except as described
in secondary sources, is the large body of records of post-October
1 interrogations of prisoners held by the Indonesian Army and the records
of the numerous trials that have been held. Undoubtedly new insights
can be derived from these materials. The author's knowledge of Indonesia
in general is relatively sparse, although he has visited the
country and spent some time in previous years studying Indonesian
political development. The present paper is the product of a month of
very intensive research on the events of 1965 as well as some limited
examination of studies on the CIA.