Indonesia's official version of the Gestapu "coup"

The statement, more or less a hypothesis, is provided by the Indonesian Army that:
  1. the PKI was the SOLE mastermind of the Gestapu "coup",
  2. President Sukarno possessed foreknowledge of the "coup".
[Sources: Notosusanto and Saleh, 1968; Widjanarko, 1974]

The statement is based on:

  1. the fact that the PKI leader (Dipa Nusantara Aidit) was at the Halim airbase and the PKI organizations ("Pemuda Rakyat" and "Gerwani") were present at the murder and burial scene indicated that the PKI was involved.
  2. an "evidence" that the PKI Special Bureau "Biro Khusus" agents Sjam (alias Kamaruzzaman) and Pono (alias Bono) were in contact with the Gestapu plotters,
  3. the presence of President Sukarno at Halim air base (based solely on a document purporting to be a record of the Army interrogation of a Sukarno-aide until 1966 - a Colonel Bambang Widjanarko of the Marine Corps), and Sukarno's refusal to condemn the PKI or show any real sympathy for the murdered Army Generals.
The weaknesses of Indonesia's official statement:
  1. The PKI leader (Dipa Nusantara Aidit) was never brought to a public trial, not even to MAHMILUB (Extraordinary Military Tribunal) set up by Maj. Gen. Suharto. The controversy went on until 5 October 1980, the 15th anniversary of Armed Forces' Day after the "coup". An account of Aidit's death appeared, unexplained, in Kompas Minggu, one of Jakarta's major newspaper (Southwood and Flanagan, 1983). The following account by Aidit's direct executioner, Colonel (now General) Yasir Hadibroto, appears credible because of independent corroborative evidence.

    On 2 October 1965, after hearing news of the "coup", Yasir, then commander of the IVth Infantry Brigade of KOSTRAD in North Sumatra, went straight to his commander at KOSTRAD headquarters in Jakarta. His commander was (then) Maj. Gen. Suharto, today's Indonesian President. He was asked by Suharto:

    "Where were you at the time of the PKI Madiun rebellion in 1948?" "I had just moved to West Java. My company was ordered to confront three communists batallions at Wonosobo", answered Yasir. "The people rebelling today are the offspring of the Madiun PKI. Go and deal with them all ['bereskan itu semua']. D.N. Aidit is in Central Java. Take your troops there", ordered the KOSTRAD commander.
    In Central Java, Aidit (the PKI leader) was captured, and Yasir took him to the local KOSTRAD batallion in Boyolali:

    Some officers and men woke up. "What's going on?" they asked. "I've got the slant-eyed PKI guy", replied Yasir. Then he asked, "Is there a well any where?" "Yes, over there", said the men. The fugitive was taken straight to the place indicated. Aidit was told to stand there. He was given half an hour before being dealth with. He made use of his half-hour to deliver a speech. This passion with which he spoke made all who heard him very angry and they were unable to control their emotions, so the rifles went off.

    Later, Yasir made his report to Suharto (his KOSTRAD commander):

    15:00 o'clock, 24 November 1965. Col Yasir was received by Pak Harto [Suharto] at the State Palace in Yogyakarta. He reported everything that had happened concerning the arrest of the PKI fugitive and the way he [Aidit] had been dealth with. After making his report, Col. Yasir took courage to ask: "When you said we were to deal with things, is this what you meant ?"
    The Commander of KOSTRAD [Suharto] only SMILED.

  2. Sjam was a cadre of the PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party) and around the same period he had also been in touch with Lt. Col.Suharto, today's Indonesian President, who often came to stay in his house in Yogyakarta (Wertheim, 1979); besides, Sjam (although sentenced to death in 1968) and Pono (alias Bono, his assistant in the Special Bureau) have been treated extaordinarily well in prison, and May (1978) quoted as writing:

    "Indonesians who were released after having been detained following the riots in January 1974 said they saw the two men in prison. Far from having been executed, they were allowed OUT from time to time and wrote reports for the Army on the political situation."

  3. The Widjanarko testimony (1974) if used to implicate President Sukarno in the Gestapu "coup" is doubtful. The Army interrogated Widjanarko to try to prove Sukarno's involvement in the "coup". But as Utrecht (1975) revealed, that the original copy of the testimony was not even signed by Widjanarko himself. Moreover, he himself, as Utrecht (1975) clarified, wished to DISSOCIATE himself completely from the report of his interrogations in 1966-1967.