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January 1987
The statement declares that it is an absolute condition for
every revolutionary, and even more so for every Communist,
to grasp the truth that "the main problem of every revolution
is the problem of state power".
The oppressed classes, in liberating themselves from exploitation
and oppression, have no other way but to make a revolution, that is to
say, overthrowing by force the oppressor classes from state power, or
seizing state power by force. Because, the state is an instrument
created by the ruling classes to oppress the ruled classes.
But, for a genuine people's revolution in the present
modern era, it is not enough just to wrest the power from the
hands of the oppressor classes, and to make use of the power
that has been wrested. Marx has taught us that the destruction
of the old military-bureaucratic state machine is "the
prerequisite for every genuine people's revolution" (Lenin,
State and Revolution). A genuine people's revolution will
achieve decisive victory only after it has accomplished this
prerequisite, while at the same time it sets up a completely new
state apparatus whose task is to suppress by force and mercilessly
the resistance put up by the overthrown oppressor classes.
What should the August Revolution of 1945 (1)
have done with regard to the state power?
As a prerequisite, the August Revolution of 1945 should
have smashed the colonial state machine along with all of its
apparatuses that had been established to maintain colonial
domination of Indonesia, and not merely transferred the
power to the Republic of Indonesia. The August Revolution
of 1945 should have established a completely new state, a
state jointly ruled by all the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal
classes under the leadership of the working class. This is
what is to be called a people's democratic state.
The statement points out that due to the absence of the
working class' leadership, the Republic of Indonesia was inevitably
a state ruled by the bourgeoisie, despite the participation
of the proletariat. A state with such a class character can never
become an instrument of the 1945 August Revolution. Without
the dictatorship of people's democracy, the August Revolution of
1945 did not have an instrument to defeat its enemies, and
consequently was unable to accomplish its tasks, namely the
complete liquidation of imperialist domination and the remnants
of feudalism.
The Communists' voluntary withdrawal of a cabinet led by
themselves in 1948 had opened up the broadest opportunity for the
reactionary bourgeoisie led by Muhamad Hatta to make the state power
fall into its hands. This reactionary bourgeoisie then betrayed the
August Revolution by unleashing white terror, the Madiun affair,
(2) as a prelude to the restoration of the Dutch
imperialist interests through the conclusion of the despicable
agreement of the round-table conference, which turned Indonesia
into a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country.
The statement says that the resurgence of the revolutionary
struggle of the Indonesian people in continuing the fight against
the oppression by imperialism and the remnants of feudalism after
the round-table conference, had gained certain political victories
of partial and reform nature, which had led to the lessening of the
anti-democratic character of the bourgeois power.
It was a great mistake to assume that the existence of
such a government signified a fundamental change in the
class character of the state power. It was equally incorrect to
assume that the above-mentioned facts marked the birth and
the development of an aspect representing the interests of
the people, or of a pro-people aspect, within the state
power. Such an error, that was formulated in the "theory of
two aspects in state power", led to the conclusion that
according to the before-mentioned facts, within the state
power of the Republic of Indonesia there existed two aspects,
the "anti-people aspect" consisting of comprador, bureaucrat
capitalist and landlord classes on the one hand, and the
'pro-people aspect' composed mainly of the national
bourgeoisie and the proletariat on the other hand.
According to this "two-aspect theory", a miracle could
happen in Indonesia. namely that the state could cease to be
an instrument of the ruling oppressor classes to subjugate
other classes, but it could be made an instrument shared by
both the oppressor classes and the oppressed classes. And the
fundamental change in state power, that is to say, the birth of
a people's power, could be peacefully accomplished by developing
the "pro-people aspect" and gradually liquidating
the "anti-people aspect".
The statement points out that hoping for a fundamental
change in state power. to usher the people into the position of
power, through the victory of the "pro-people aspect" over
the "anti-people aspect" in line with the "theory of two
aspects in state power". was but a pure illusion. The people
will be able to gain power only through an armed revolution
under the leadership of the working class to overthrow the
power of the comprador bourgeoisie, the bureaucrat capitalists
and the landlords which represent the interests of imperialism
and the remnants of feudalism.
The "theory of two aspects in state power" has in practice
deprived the proletariat of its independence in the united
front with the national bourgeoisie, dissolved the interests of
the proletariat in that of the national bourgeoisie, and placed
the proletariat in a position as a tail-end of the national
bourgeoisie.
To return the proletariat to its position of leadership in
the liberation struggle of the Indonesian people, it is absolutely
necessary to rectify the mistake of the "theory of two aspects in
state power", and to do away with the erroneous view with regard
to Marxist-Leninist teaching on state and revolution.
The Main Weaknesses in the Ideological Field
The serious weaknesses and mistakes of the Party in the period
after 1951, the self-criticism says, certainly had as their source the
weaknesses in ideological field, too, especially among the Party
leadership. Instead of integrating revolutionary theories with the
concrete practice of the Indonesian revolution, the Party leadership
adopted the road which was divorced from the guidance of the most
advanced theories. This experience shows that the P.K.I. had not
succeeded as yet in establishing a core of leadership that was
composed of proletarian elements, which really had the most correct
understanding of Marxism-Leninism, systematic and not fragmentary,
practical and not abstract understanding.
During the period after 1951, subjectivism continued to grow,
gradually became greater and greater and gave rise to Right
opportunism that merged with the influence of modern revisionism in
the international communist movement. This was the black line of
Right opportunism which became the main feature of the mistakes
committed by the P.K.l. in this period. The rise and the development
of these weaknesses and errors were caused by the following
factors:
First, the tradition of criticism and self-criticism in a
Marxist-Leninist way was not developed in the Party, especially among
the Party leadership.
The rectification and study movements which from time to time were
organized in the Party were not carried out seriously and
persistently, their results were not summed up in a good manner, and
they were not followed by the appropriate measures in the
organizational field. Study movements were aimed more at the rank and
file, and never at unfolding criticism and self-criticisms among the
leader- ship. Criticism from below far from being carefully listened
to, was even suppressed.
Second, the penetration of the bourgeois ideology along two
channels, through contacts with the national bourgeoisie when the
Party established a united front with them, and through the
bourgeoisification of Party cadres, especially the leadership, after
the Party obtained certain positions in governmental and
semi-governmental institutions. The increasing number of Party cadres
who occupied certain positions in governmental and semi-governmental
institutions in the centre and in the regions, created "the rank of
bourgeoisified workers" and this constituted "the real channels for
reformism". (5) Such a situation did not exist
before the August Revolution of 1945.
Third, modern revisionism began to penetrate into our Party
when the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Fifth
Congress uncritically approved a report which supported the lines of
the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., and adopted the line of "achieving
socialism peacefully through parliamentary means as the line of the
P.K.I. This "peaceful road", one of the characteristics of modern
revisionism, was further reaffirmed in the Sixth National Congress of
the P.K.I. which approved the following passage in the Party
Constitution: "There is a possibility that a people's democratic
system as a transitional stage to socialism in Indonesia can be
achieved by peaceful means, in parliamentary way. The P.K.I.
persistently strives to transform this possibility into a reality."
This revisionist line was further emphasized in the Seventh National
Congress of the P.K.I. and was never corrected, not even when our
Party was already aware that since the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U.,
the leadership of the C.P.S.U. had been following the road of modern
revisionism.
The self-criticism stresses that the experience of the P.K.I.
provides the lesson that by criticizing the modern revisionism of the
C.P.S.U. leadership alone, it does not mean that the P.K.I. itself
will automatically be free from errors of Right opportunism, the same
as what the modern revisionists are doing. The experience of the
P.K.I. provides the lesson that modern revisionism, the greatest
danger in the international communist movement, is also the greatest
danger for the P.K.I. For the P.K.I., modern revisionism is not "a
latent but not an acute dang, but a concrete danger that has
brought great damage to the Party and serious losses for the
revolutionary movement of the Indonesian people. Therefore, we must
not in any way underestimate the danger of modern revisionism and must
wage a resolute and ruthless struggle against it. The firm stand
against modern revisionism in all fields can be effectively maintained
only when our Party abandons the line of of "preserving friendship with
the modern revisionis.
It is a fact that the P.K.I., while criticizing the modern
revisionism of the C.P.S.U. leadership, also made revisionist
mistakes itself, because it had revised Marxist-Leninist teachings on
class struggle, state and revolution. Furthermore, the P.K.I.
leadership not only did not wage a struggle in the theoretical field
against other er "revolutiona political thoughts which could mislead
the proletariat, as Lenin has taught us to do, but had voluntarily
given concessions in the theoretical field. The P.K.l. leadership
maintained that there was an identity between the three components of
Marxism: materialist philosophy, political economy and scientific
socialism, and the so-called ed "three components of Sukarno's teachings"
- They wanted to make Marxism, which is the ideology of the working
class, the property of the whole nation which includes the exploiting
classes hostile to the working class.
The Main Errors in the Political Field
The self-criticism says that the mistakes of Right opportunism in
the political field which are now under discussion include three
problems: (1) the road to people's democracy in Indonesia, (2) the
question of state power, and (3) the implementation of the policy of
the national united front.
One of the fundamental differences and problems of disputes between
Marxism-Leninism and modern revisionism lies precisely in the problem
of choosing the road to socialism. Marxism-Leninism teaches that
socialism can only be achieved through the road of proletarian
revolution and that in the case of colonial or semi-colonial and
semi-feudal countries like Indonesia, socialism can only be achieved
by first completing the stage of the people's democratic revolution.
On the contrary, revisionism dreams of achieving socialism through the
"peaceful ro.
During the initial years of this period since 1951, our Party had
achieved certain results in the political struggle as well as in the
building of the Party. One important achievement of this period was
the formulation of the main problems of the Indonesian revolution. It
was formulated that the present stage of the Indonesian revolution was
a new-type bourgeois democratic revolution, whose tasks were to
liquidate imperialism and the vestiges of feudalism and to establish a
people's democratic system as a transitional stage to socialism. The
driving forces of the revolution were the working class, the peasantry
and the petty bourgeoisie: the leading force of the revolution was
the working class and the principal mass strength of the revolution
was the peasantry. It was also formulated that the national
bourgeoisie was a wavering force of the revolution who might side with
the revolution to certain limits and at certain periods but who, at
other times, might betray the revolution. The Party furthermore
formulated that the working class in order to fulfil its obligation as
the leader of the revolution, must forge a revolutionary united front
with other revolutionary classes and groups based on worker-peasant
alliance and under the leadership of the working class.
However, there was a very important shortcoming
which in later days developed into Right opportunism or
revisionism, namely, that the Party had not yet come to the
clearest unity of minds on the principal means and the main
form of struggle of the Indonesian revolution.
The Chinese revolution, the self-criticism says, has provided the
lesson concerning the main form of struggle of the revolution in
colonial or semi-colonial and semi-feudal countries, namely, the
people's armed struggle against the armed counter-revolution. In line
with the essence of the revolution as an agrarian revolution, then the
essence of the people's armed struggle is the armed struggle of the
peasants in an agrarian revolution under the leadership of the working
class. The practice of the Chinese revolution is first and foremost
the application of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete conditions of
China. At the same time, it has laid down the general law for the
revolutions of the peoples in colonial or semi-colonial and
semi-feudal countries.
To achieve its complete victory, it stresses, the Indonesian
revolution must also follow the road of the Chinese revolution. This
means that the Indonesian revolution must inevitably adopt this main
form of struggle, namely, the people's armed struggle against the
armed counter-revolution which, in essence, is the armed agrarian
revolution of the peasants under the leadership of the
proletariat.
All forms of legal and parliamentary work should serve
the principal means and the main form of struggle, and must
not in any way impede the process of the ripening of armed
struggle.
The experience during the last fifteen years has taught us
that starting from not explicitly denying the he "peaceful ro and not
firmly holding to the general law of revolution in colonial or
semi-colonial and semi-feudal countries, the P.K.I. gradually got
bogged down in parliamentary and other forms of legal struggle. The
Party leadership even considered this to he the main form of struggle
to achieve the strategic aim of the Indonesian revolution. The
legality of the Party was not considered as one method of struggle at
a given time and under certain conditions, but was rather regarded as
a principle, while other forms of struggle should serve this
principle. Even when counter-revolution not only has trampled
underfoot the legality of the Party, but has violated the basic human
rights of the Communists as well, the Party leadership still tried to
defend this is "legality" with all their might.
The "peaceful ro was firmly established in the Party when the
Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Fifth Congress
in 1956 adopted a document which approved the modern revisionist line
of the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U. In such a situation, when the
revisionist line was already firmly established in the Party, it was
impossible to have a correct Marxist-Leninist line of strategy and
tactics. The formulation of the main lines of strategy and tactics of
the Party started from a vacillation between the he "peaceful road" and
the "road of armed revolution", in the process of which the "peaceful
road" finally became dominant.
Under such conditions, the General Line of the P.K.I. was
formulated by the Sixth National Congress (1959). It reads, "To
continue the forging of the national united front, and to continue the
building of the Party, so as to accomplish the demands of the August
Revolution of 1945." Based on the General Line of the Party, the
slogan "Raise the Three Banners of the Par was decided. These
were: (1) the banner of the national united front, (2) the banner of
the building of the Party, and (3) the banner of the 1945 August
Revolution. The General Line was meant as the road to people's
democracy in Indonesia.
The Party leadership tried to explain that the Three Banners of the
Party were the three main weapons to win the people's democratic
revolution which, as Comrade Mao Tsetung has said, were ra
well-disciplined Party armed with the theory of Marxism-Leninism,
using the method of self- criticism and linked with the masses of the
people; an army under the leadership of such a Party: a united front
of all revolutionary classes and all revolutionary groups under the
leadership of such a Party" .(6)
Thus the second main weapon means that there must be
a people's armed struggle against armed counterrevolution
under the leadership of the Party. The Party leadership tried
to replace this with the slogan "Raise the banner of the 1945
August Revolution".
In order to prove that the road followed was not the opportunist
"peaceful road", the Party leadership always spoke of the two
possibilities, the possibility of a "peaceful road" and the
possibility of a non-peaceful road. They held that the better the
Party prepared itself to face the possibility of a non-peaceful road,
the greater would be the possibility of a "peaceful road". By doing
so the Party leadership cultivated in the minds of Party members, the
working class and the masses of the working people the hope for a
peaceful road which in reality did not exist.
In practice, the Party leadership did not prepare the
whole ranks of the Party, the working class and the masses of the
people to face the possibility of a non-peaceful road. The most
striking proof of it was the grave tragedy which happened after the
outbreak and the failure of the September 30th Movement. Within a
very short space of time, the counter-revolution succeeded in
massacring and arresting hundreds of thousands of Communists and
non-communist revolutionaries who found themselves in a passive
position, paralysing the organization of the P.K.l. and the
revolutionary mass organizations. Such a situation surely would never
happen if the Party leadership did not deviate from the revolutionary
road.
The Party leadership declared, says the self-criticism that aour
Party must not copy the theory of armed struggle abroad, but must
carry out the Method of Combining the Three Forms of Struggle:
guerrilla warfare in the countryside (especially by farm labourers and
poor peasants) revolutionary actions by the workers (especially
transport workers) in cities, and intensive work among the enemy's
armed forcesc. The Party leadership criticized some comrades who, in
studying the experience of the armed struggle of the Chinese people.
were considered seeing only its similarities with the conditions in
Indonesia. On the contrary, the Party leadership put forward several
allegedly different conditions that must be taken into account, until
they arrived at the conclusion that the method typical to the
Indonesian revolution was the he "Method of Combining the Three Forms of
Struggle".
To fulfil its heavy but great and noble historical mission, to lead
the people's revolution against imperialism, feudalism and
bureaucrat-capitalism. the Indonesian Marxist-Leninists must firmly
reject the revisionist "peaceful road", reject the "theory of the
Method of Combining the Three Forms of Struggle" and hold aloft the
banner of armed people's revolution. Following the example of the
glorious Chinese revolution. the Indonesian Marxist- Leninists must
establish revolutionary base areas; they must "turn the backward
villages into advanced. consolidated base areas, into great military.
political, economic and cultural bastions of the revoluti.
While working for the realization of this most principal question
we must also carry out other forms of struggle; armed struggle will
never advance without being coordinated with other forms of
struggle.
The line of Right opportunism followed by the Party leadership was
also reflected in their attitude with regard to the state, in
particular to the state of the Republic of Indonesia, the
self-criticism says.
Based on this Marxist-Leninist teaching on state, the task
of the P.K.I., after the August Revolution of 1945 failed,
should have been the education of the Indonesian working
class and the rest of the working people, so as to make them
understand as clearly as possible the class nature of the state
of the Republic of Indonesia as a bourgeois dictatorship. The
P.K.I. should have aroused the consciousness of the working
class and the working people that their struggle for liberation
would inevitably lead to the necessity of of "superseding the
bourgeois state" by the people's state under the leadership of
the working class. through a "violent revoluti. But the
P.K.I. leadership took the opportunist line that gave rise to
the illusion among the people about bourgeois democracy.
The self-criticism says that the climax of the deviation
from Marxist-Leninist teaching on state committed by the
Party leadership was the formulation of the he "theory of the
two aspects in the state power of the Republic of Indonesia".
The "two-aspect theo viewed the state and the state
power in the following way:
The state power of the Republic, viewed as contradiction. is a contradiction between two opposing aspects. This first aspect is the aspect which represents the interests of the people (manifested by the progressive stands and policies of President Sukarno that are supported by the P.K.I. and other groups of the people). The second aspect is the aspect that represents the enemies of the people (manifested by the stands and policies of the Right- wing forces and die-hards). The people's aspect has now become the main aspect and takes the leading role in the state power of the Republic.
The he "two-aspect theory" obviously is an opportunist or revisionist
deviation, because it denies the Marxist-Leninist teaching that "the
state is an organ of the rule of a definite class which cannot be
reconciled with its antipode (the class opposite to it)".
(7) It is unthinkable that the Republic of Indonesia can
be jointly ruled by the people and the enemies of the people.
The self-criticism says that the Party leadership who wallowed in
the mire of opportunism claimed that the "people's aspe had become
the main aspect and taken the hegemony in the state power of the
Republic. It was as if the Indonesian people were nearing the birth
of a people's power. And since they considered that the forces of the
national bourgeoisie in the state power really constituted the
he
"people's aspect", the Party leadership had done everything to defend
and develop this "people's aspect". The Party leadership had
altogether merged themselves in the interests of the national
bourgeoisie.
By considering the national bourgeoisie the "people's aspe in
the state power of the Republic, and President Sukarno the leader of
this aspect, the Party leadership erroneously recognized that the
national bourgeoisie was able to lead the new-type democratic
revolution. This is contrary to historical necessity and historical
facts.
The Party leadership declared that the he "two-aspect theory" was
completely different from the "theory of structural reform"
(8) of the leadership of the revisionist Italian
Communist Party. However, the fact is, theoretically or on the basis
of practical realities, there is no difference between the two
"theories". Both have for their starting point the "peaceful road" to
socialism. Both dream of a gradual change in the internal balance of
forces in the state power. Both reject the road of revolution and
both are revisionist.
The anti-revolutionary "two-aspect theory" glaringly exposed itself
in the statement that "the struggle of the P.K.I. with regard to the
state power is to promote the pro-people aspect so as to make it
bigger and dominant, and the anti- people force can be driven out from
the state power".
The Party leadership even had a name for this anti-
revolutionary road; they called it the road of "revolution
from above and below". By "revolution from above" they
meant that the P.K.I. "must encourage the state power to
take revolutionary steps aimed at making the desired
changes in the personnel and in the state organs". While by
"revolution from below" they meant that the P.K.I. "must
arouse, organize and mobilize the people to achieve the same
chang. It is indeed an extraordinary phantasy! The Party
leadership did not learn from the fact that the concept of
President Sukarno on the formation of a co-operation cabinet
(the old-type government of national coalition), eight years
after its announcement, had not been realized as yet. There
was even no sign that it would ever be realized, despite the
insistent demands. Let alone a change in the state power!
The self-criticism stresses that to clean itself from the
mire of opportunism, our Party must discard this is "theory of
two-aspect in the state power" and re-establish the Marxist-
Leninist teaching on state and revolution.
The 5th National Congress of the Party in the main had
solved theoretically the problem of the national united front.
It formulated that the worker-peasant alliance was the basis
of the national united front. With regard to the national
bourgeoisie a lesson had been drawn on the basis of the experience
during the August Revolution that this class had a wavering character.
In a certain situation, the national bourgeoisie took part in the
revolution and sided with the revolution, while in another situation
they followed in the steps of the comprador-bourgeoisie to attack the
driving forces of the revolution and betrayed the revolution (as shown
by their activities during the Madiun Provocation and their approval
of the Round Table Conference Agreement). Based on this wavering
character of the national bourgeoisie, the Party formulated the stand
that must be taken by the P.K.I., namely, to make continuous efforts
to win the national bourgeoisie over to the side of revolution, while
guarding against the possibility of its betraying the revolution. The
P.K.I. must follow the policy of unity and struggle towards the
national bourgeoisie, the self-criticism says.
Nevertheless, since the ideological weakness of subjectivism in the
Party, particularly among the Party leadership, had not yet been
eradicated, the Party was dragged into more and more serious mistakes,
to such an extent that the Party lost its independence in the united
front with the national bourgeoisie. This mistake had led to the
situation in which the Party and the proletariat were placed as the
appendage of the national bourgeoisie.
The self-criticism states that a manifestation of this loss
of independence in the united front with the national
bourgeoisie was the evaluation and the stand of the Party
leadership towards Sukarno. The Party leadership did not
adopt an independent attitude towards Sukarno. They had
always avoided conflicts with Sukarno and, on the contrary,
had greatly over-emphasized the similarities and the unity
between the Party and Sukarno. The public saw that there
was no policy of Sukarno that was not supported by the
P.K.I. The Party leadership went so far as to accept without
any struggle the recognition to Sukarno as "the great leader
of the revolution" and the leader of the "people's aspect" in
the state power of the Republic. In many articles and
speeches, the Party leaders frequently said that the struggle
of the P.K.I. was based not only on Marxism-Leninism, but
also on "the teachings of Sukarno", that the P.K.I. made such
a rapid progress because it realized Sukarno's idea of
Nasakom unity,(9) etc. Even the concept of the people's
democratic system in Indonesia was said to be in conformity
with Sukarno's main ideas as expressed in his speech "The
Birth of Pantjasila"(10) on June 1,1945.
The self-criticism repudiates the erroneous view that "to
implement the Political Manifesto in a consistent manner is
the same as implementing the programme of the P.K.
The statement that consistently implementing the Political
Manifesto meant implementing the programme of the P.K.I. could only
be interpreted that it was not the pro- gramme of the P.K.I. that was
accepted by the bourgeoisie, but that, on the contrary, it was the
programme of the national bourgeoisie which was accepted by the
P.K.I., and was made to replace the programme of the P.K.I., it points
out.
The self-criticism says that the abandonment of principle in the
united front with the national bourgeoisie had developed even further
in the so-called ed "General Line of the Indonesian Revolution" that was
formulated as follows: "With the national united front having the
workers and peasants as its pillars, the Nasakom as the core and the
Pantjasila as its ideological basis, to complete the national
democratic revolution in order to advance towards Indone- sian
Socialism." This so-called "General Line of the Indone- sian
Revoluti had not even the faintest smell of the revolution.
Because, from the three preconditions to win the revolution, namely, a
strong Marxist-Leninist Party, a peo- ple's armed struggle under the
leadership of the Party, and a united front, only the united front was
retained. Even then, it was not a revolutionary united front, because
it was not led by the working class, nor was it based on the alliance
of the working class and the peasantry under the leadership of the
working class, but on the contrary it was based on the Nasakom.
The Party leadership said that at "the slogan for national
co-operation with the Nasakom as the core will by no means
obscure the class content of the national united fro. This
statement is incorrect. The class content of the Nasakom was
the working class, the national bourgeoisie, and even
elements of the compradors, the bureaucrat-capitalists and
the landlords. Obviously, putting the Nasakom in the core
not only meant obscuring the class content of the national
united front, but radically changing the meaning of the
revolutionary national united front into an alliance of the
working class with all other classes in the country, including
the reactionary classes, into class collaboration.
This error must be corrected. The Party must throw to
the dust-bin the erroneous us "General Line of the Indonesian
Revolution" and return to the correct conception of a revolutionary
national united front based on the alliance of the
workers and peasants under the leadership of the working
class.
The abandonment of principle in the united front with
the national bourgeoisie was also the result of the Party's in-
ability to make a correct and concrete analysis of the con-
crete situation, the self-criticism says.
The self-criticism points out that ever since the failure of
the August Revolution of 1945, except in West Irian, the im-
perialists did not hold direct political power in Indonesia. In
Indonesia, political power was in the hands of compradors
and landlords who represented the interests of imperialism
and the vestiges of feudalism. Besides, there was no im-
perialist aggression in Indonesia taking place. Under such a
situation, provided that the P.K.I. did not make political
mistakes, the contradiction between the ruling reactionary
classes and the people would develop and sharpen, constitut-
ing the main contradiction in Indonesia. The primary task of
the Indonesian revolution is the overthrow of the rule of the
reactionary classes within the country who also represent
the interests of the imperialists, in particular the United
States imperialists. Only by taking this road can the real li-
quidation of imperialism and the vestiges of feudalism be
realized.
By correcting the mistakes made by the Party in the
united front with the national bourgeoisie it does not mean
that now the Party need not unite with this class. On the
basis of the worker-peasant alliance under the leadership of
the working class, our Party must work to win the national
bourgeois class over to the side of the revolution.
The Main Mistakes in the organizational Field
The self-criticism says that the erroneous political line
which dominated the Party was inevitably followed by an
equally erroneous organizational line. The longer and the
more intensive the wrong political line ruled in the Party, the
greater were the mistakes in the organizational field, and the
greater the losses caused by them. Right opportunism which
constituted the wrong political line of the Party in the period
after 1951 had been followed by another Right deviation in
the organizational field, namely, liberalism and legalism.
The line of liberalism in the organizational field
manifested itself in the tendency to make the P.K.I. a Party
with as large a membership as possible, a Party with a loose
organization, which was called a mass Party.
It says that the mass character of the Party is not deter-
mined above all by the large membership, but primarily by
the close ties linking the Party and the masses, by the Party's
political line which defends the interests of the masses, or in
other words by the implementation of the Party's mass line.
And the mass line of the Party can only be maintained when
the prerequisites determining the Party's role as the ad-
vanced detachment are firmly upheld, when the Party
members are made up of the best elements of the proletariat
who are armed with Marxism-Leninism. Consequently, to
build a Marxist-Leninist Party which has a mass character is
impossible without giving primary importance to Marxist-
Leninist education.
The self-criticism points out that during the last few
years, the P.K.I. had carried out a line of Party building
which deviated from the principles of Marxism-Leninism in
the organizational field.
The self-criticism says that this liberal expansion of Party
membership could not be separated from the political line of
the he "peaceful road". The large membership was intended to
increase the influence of the Party in the united front with
the national bourgeoisie. The idea was to effect the gradual
change in the balance of forces that would make it possible to
completely defeat the die-hard forces, with a Party that was
growing bigger and bigger, in addition to the continued
policy of unity with the national bourgeoisie.
The stress was no longer laid on the education and the
training of Marxist-Leninist cadres to prepare them for the
revolution, for work among the peasants in order to establish
revolutionary bases, but on the education of intellectuals to
serve the needs of the work in the united front with the national
bourgeoisie, and to supply cadres for the various positions
in the state institutions that were obtained thanks to the
co-operation with the national bourgeoisie. The slogan of
of
"total integration with the peasan had become empty
talk. What was being done in practice was to draw cadres
from the countryside to the cities, from the regions to the
centre, instead of sending the best cadres to work in the rural
areas.
To raise the prestige of the P.K.I. in the eyes of the
bourgeoisie, and to make it respected as the Party of intellectuals,
the 4-Year Plan stipulated that all cadres of the higher
ranks must obtain academic education, cadres of the middle
ranks high school education, and cadres of the lower ranks
lower middle school education. For this purpose the Party
had set up a great number of academies, schools and courses.
So deep-rooted was the intellectualism gripping the Party
leadership that all Party leaders and prominent figures of the
popular movements were obliged to write four theses in
order to obtain the degree of of "Marxist Scientist".
The deeper the Party was plunged into the mire of opportunism and
revisionism, the greater it lacked organizational vigilance and the
more extensively legalism developed in the organization. The Party
leadership had lost its class prejudice towards the falsehood of
bourgeois democracy. All the ac- tivities of the Party indicated as
if the hpeaceful road' was an inevitable certainty. The Party
leadership did not arouse the vigilance of the masses of Party members
to the danger of the attacks by the reactionaries who were constantly
on the look for the chance to strike. Due to this legalism in the
organiza- tional field, within a short span of time counter-revolution
has succeeded in paralysing the P.K.I. organizationally.
Liberalism in organization had destroyed the principle of
internal democracy in the Party, destroyed collective leadership
and had given rise to personal leadership and personal
rule, to autonomism.
In a situation when liberalism dominated the organizational line
of the Party, it was impossible to realize the Party's style of work
"to combine theory and practice, to keep close bonds with the
masses and to conduct self-criticism. It was equally impossible to realize the method of
leadership whose essence is the unity of the leadership and
the masses; to realize it the leadership must give an example
to the rank-and-file.
The self-criticism points out that thus, in general the
wrong political line which ruled in the Party was followed by
the wrong line in the organizational field which violated the
principles of a Marxist-Leninist Party, destroyed the
organizational foundation of the Party, namely, democratic
centralism, and trampled on the Party's style of work and
method of leadership.
The self-criticism emphatically points out that to build the P.K.I.
as a Marxist-Leninist Party, we must thoroughly uproot liberalism in
the organizational field and its ideological source. The P.K.I. must
be rebuilt as a Lenin-type Party, a Party that will be capable of
fulfilling its role as the advanced detachment and the highest form of
class organization of the Indonesian proletariat, a Party with a
historical mission of leading the masses of the Indonesian people to
win victory in the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal and anti-
bureaucrat-capitalist revolution, and to advance towards socialism.
Such a Party must fulfil the following conditions: Ideologically, it
is armed with the theory of Marxism- Leninism, and free from
subjectivism, opportunism and modern revisionism; politically, it has
a correct programme which includes a revolutionary agrarian programme,
has a thorough understanding of the problems of the strategy and
tactics of the Indonesian revolution, masters the main form of
struggle, namely, the armed struggle of the peasants under the
leadership of the proletariat, as well as other forms of struggle, is
capable of establishing a revolutionary united front of all
anti-imperialist and anti-feudal classes based on the worker-peasant
alliance under the leadership of the working class; organizationally,
it is strong and has a deep root among the masses of the people,
consists of trustworthy, experienced and steeled Party members who are
models in the implementation of the national tasks.
Today, we are rebuilding our Party under the reign of
counter-revolutionary white terror which is most cruel and ferocious.
The legality of the Party and the basic human rights of the Communists
have been wantonly violated. The Party, therefore, has to be
organized and has to work in complete illegality. While working in
complete illegality, the Party must be adept at utilizing to the full
all possible opportunities to carry out legal activities according to
circumstances, and to choose ways and means that are acceptable to the
masses with the aim of mobilizing the masses for struggle and leading
this struggle step by step to a higher stage.
The self-criticism stresses that in rebuilding the P.K.I.
along the Marxist-Leninist line, the greatest attention should
be devoted to the building of Party organizations in the rural
areas, to the establishment of revolutionary bases.
The task to rebuild a Marxist-Leninist Party as has been
stated above requires arduous and protracted work, and is
full of danger, and consequently it must be carried out
courageously, perseveringly, carefully, patiently and persistently.
The Way Out
The self-criticism says that once we know the weakness-
es and mistakes of the Party during the period after 1951 as
have been explained above, obviously what we have to do is
to realize the most urgent tasks faced by the Indonesian
Marxist-Leninists at the present time, the first one being the
rebuilding of the P.K.I. as a Marxist-Leninist Party which is
free from subjectivism, opportunism and modern revisionism.
To rebuild the P.K.I. as such a Marxist-Leninist Party,
Party cadres of all levels and then all Party members must
reach a unanimity of mind with regard to the mistakes made
by the Party in the past, as well as concerning the new road
that must be taken.
Subjectivism can be effectively combated and liquidated
when the ability of the whole Party to distinguish proletarian
ideology from the ideology of the petty bourgeoisie is raised,
and when criticism and self-criticism is encouraged. To raise
the ability of the whole Party to distinguish proletarian
ideology from the ideology of the petty bourgeoisie will be
possible only by intensifying the education of Marxism-
Leninism. The Party must educate its members to apply the
Marxist-Leninist method in analysing the political situation
and in evaluating the forces of the existing classes, so that
subjective analysis and evaluation can be avoided. The Party
must draw the attention of the members to the importance of
investigation and study of social and economic conditions, in
order to be able to define the tactics of struggle and the corresponding method of work. The Party must help the
members to understand that without an investigation of the
actual conditions they will get bogged down in phantasy.
The self-criticism emphatically points out that the ex-
perience of the struggle waged by the Party in the past has
shown how indispensable it is for the Indonesian Marxist-
Leninists, who are resolved to defend Marxism-Leninism
and to combat modern revisionism, to study not only the
teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, but also to
devote special attention to studying the Thought of Mao Tsetung who has succeeded in brilliantly inheriting, defending
and developing Marxism-Leninism to its peak in the present
era.
The P.K.I. will be able to hold aloft the banner of
Marxism-Leninism, only when it takes a resolute stand in the
struggle against modern revisionism which today is centred
around the leading group of the C.P.S.U. The fight against
modern revisionism cannot be consistently carried out
while, at the same time, preserving friendship with the
modern revisionists. The P.K.I. must abandon the wrong attitude it held in the past with regard to the question of the
relations with the modern revisionists. Loyalty to proletarian
internationalism can only be manifested by a merciless stand
in the struggle against modern revisionism, because modern
revisionism has destroyed proletarian internationalism, and
betrayed the struggle of the proletariat and the oppressed
people all over the world.
In rebuilding the Party, the Indonesian Marxist-
Leninists must devote their attention to the creation of the
conditions to lead the armed agrarian revolution to the
peasants that will become the main form of struggle to win
victory for the people's democratic revolution in Indonesia.
This means that the greatest attention should be paid to the
rebuilding of Party organizations in the rural areas. The
greatest attention must be paid to the solution of the problem
of arousing, organizing and mobilizing the peasants in an
anti.feudal agrarian revolution. The integration of the Party
with the peasants, in particular with farm labourers and poor
peasants, must be conscientiously carried out. Because, only
through such an integration will the Party be able to lead the
peasantry, and the peasantry, for their part, will be capable
of becoming the invincible bulwark of the people's
democratic revolution.
As a result of the attacks of the third white terror, Party
organizations in the rural areas in general have suffered
greater damage. This fact has rendered it more difficult and
arduous to work in the countryside. But this does not in any
way change the inexorable law that the main force of the
people's democratic revolution in Indonesia is the peasantry,
and its base area is the countryside. With the most resolute
determination that everything is for the masses of the people,
the Indonesian Marxist-Leninists will certainly be able to
overcome the gravest difficulties. By having the most whole-
hearted faith in the masses and by relying on the masses, the
Indonesian Marxist-Leninists will certainly be able to
transform the backward Indonesian villages into great and
consolidated military, political and cultural bastions of the
revolution.
The Indonesian peasants are the most interested in the
people's democratic revolution. Because, only this revolution will liberate them from the life of backwardness and inequality as a result of feudal suppression. It is only this
revolution that will give them what they have dreamt all
their lives and which will give them life: land. That is why
the peasants will surely take this road of revolution for land
and liberation, no matter how arduous and full of twists and
turns this road will be.
Obviously, the second task of the Indonesian Marxist-
Leninists at present is the creation of the necessary conditions for the armed agrarian revolution of the peasants under
the leadership of the proletariat. Provided that the Indone-
sian Marxist-Leninists succeed in arousing, organizing and
mobilizing the peasants to carry through an anti-feudal
agrarian revolution, the leadership of the working class in
the people's democratic revolution and the victory of this
revolution are assured.
However, the Party must continue the efforts to establish a revolutionary united front with other anti-imperialist
and anti-feudal classes and groups. Based on the alliance of
the working class and the peasantry under the leadership of
the proletariat, the Party must work to win over the urban
petty bourgeoisie and other democratic forces, and must also
work to win over the national bourgeoisie as an additional
ally in the people's democratic revolution. The present objective conditions offer the possibility for the establishment
of a broad revolutionary united front.
The military dictatorship of the Right-wing army generals Nasution and Suharto is the manifestation of the rule by
the most reactionary classes in the country, namely, the
comprador-bourgeoisie, the bureaucrat-capitalists and the
landlords. The internal reactionary classes under the leadership of the clique of Right-wing army generals exercise dictatorship over the Indonesian people, and act as watch-dogs
guarding the interests of imperialism, in particular United
States imperialism, in Indonesia. Consequently, the coming
into power of the military dictatorship of the Right-wing
army generals will certainly serve to intensify the suppression and exploitation of the Indonesian people by imperialism and feudalism.
The military dictatorship of the Right-wing army generals represents the interests of only a very small minority who
suppresses the overwhelming majority of the Indonesian
people. That is why the military dictatorship of the Right-
wing army generals will certainly meet with resistance from
the broad masses of the people.
Thus, the third urgent task faced by the Indonesian
Marxist-Leninists is to establish the revolutionary united
front with all anti-imperialist and anti-feudal classes and
groups based on the worker-peasant alliance under the
leadership of the working class.
Thus, it has become clear that to win victory for the peo-
ple's democratic revolution, the Indonesian Marxist-
Leninists must hold aloft the Three Banners of the Party,
namely:
The first banner, the building of a Marxist-Leninist Party
which is free from subjectivism, opportunism and modern
revisionism.
The second banner, the armed people's struggle which in
essence is the armed struggle of the peasants in an anti-feudal
agrarian revolution under the leadership of the working
class.
The third banner, the revolutionary united front based
on the worker-peasant alliance under the leadership of the
working class.
The tasks forced by the Indonesian Marxist-Leninists are
very arduous. They have to work under the most savage and
barbarous terror and persecution which have no parallel in
history. However, the Indonesian Marxist-Leninists do not
have the slightest doubt that, by correcting the mistakes
made by the Party in the past, they are now marching along
the correct road, the road of people's democratic revolution.
No matter how protracted, tortuous and full of difficulties,
this is the only road leading to a free and democratic New Indonesia, an Indonesia that will really belong to the Indonesian people. For this noble cause, we must have the courage
to traverse the long road.
The self-criticism points out that the Indonesian Marxist-
leninists and revolutionaries on the basis of their own experience in struggle, do not have the slightest doubt about the
correctness of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's thesis that at "the imperialists and all reactionaries are paper tigers. In appearance they are terrifying, but in reality they are not so powerful. From a long-term point of view, it is not the reactionaries
but the people who are really powerf. The military dictatorship of the Right-wing army generals which is now in
power is also a paper tiger. In appearance they are powerful
and terrifying. But in reality they are not so powerful,
because they are not supported but on the contrary are opposed by the people, because their ranks are beset by contradictions, and because they are quarrelling among themselves
for a bigger share of their plunder and for greater power. The
imperialists, in particular the United States imperialists who
are the mainstay of the military dictatorship of the Right-
wing army generals, are also paper tigers. In appearance they
are powerful and terrifying, but in reality they are weak and
nearing their complete downfall. The weakness of imperialism, in particular United States imperialism, is vividly
demonstrated by their inability to conquer the heroic Vietnamese people and to check the tide of the anti-imperialist
struggle waged by the people all over the world, including
the American people themselves, who are furiously dealing
blows at the fortresses of imperialism.
From a strategic point of view, the imperialists and all
reactionaries are weak, and consequently we must despise
them. By despising the enemies strategically we can build up
the courage to fight them and the confidence to defeat them.
At the same time we must take them all seriously, take into
full account of their strength tactically, and refrain from taking adventurist steps against them.
The Indonesian Marxist-Leninists will spare neither ef-
forts nor energy to fulfil the best wishes of the world Marxist-
Leninists by resolutely defending Marxism-I,eninism and
struggling against modern revisionism, by working still better for the liberation of their people and country, and for the
world proletarian revolution.
The Indonesian Marxist-Leninists who are united in
mind and determined to take the road of revolution, by putting their wholehearted faith in the people, by relying on the
people, by working courageously, perseveringly, conscientiously, patiently, persistently and vigilantly, will surely be
able to accomplish their historical mission, to lead the people's democratic revolution, to smash the military dictatorship
of the Right-wing army generals and to set up a completely new power, the people's democratic dictatorship.
With the people's democratic dictatorship, the joint power of
anti-imperialist and anti-feudal classes and groups under the
leadership of the working class, the Indonesian people will
completely liquidate imperialism and the vestiges of feudalism, build a free and democratic new society, and advance
toward Socialism where the suppression and exploitation of
man by man no longer exists.
Let us unite closely to take the road of revolution which
is illuminated by the teaching of Marxism-Leninism, the
road leading to the liberation of the Indonesian people and
proletariat, the road leading to Socialism.
(Bold-face emphases and quotation marks are in the original.)
1) On August 17, 1945 Sukarno, Hatta, and others declared Indonesia a Republic and launched the Indonesian "revolution." This "revolution" in effect was the transformation of Indonesia, which was an outright colony of Holland before World War 2, into a neocolony with the U.S. as the main imperialist overlord.
2) A "military revolt" which led to a campaign of brutal suppression against the PKI forces and sympathizers by the Indonesian government in September/October 1948.
3) On October 1, 1965, the September 30 Movement, a group of mid-level officers in the military, kidnapped a number of high-ranking generals of the Indonesian armed forces. The leader of the group said that their aim was to thwart a coup by rightist generals and bring them to account before Sukarno. According to some scholars, the September 30 Movement was infiltrated by agents-provocateurs associated with Suharto. The action by the movement was labeled a PKI 'coup attempt," and it served as the immediate pretext for a takeover by a military clique headed by Suharto and Nasution and the massacre of hundreds of thousands.
4) Mao Tsetung, "Our Study and the Current Situation," Selected Works, Vol. III.
5) V.I. Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism.
6) Mao Tsetung, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," Selected works, Vol. IV.
7) V.I. Lenin, The State and Revolution.
8)This refers to the revisionist Italian Communist Party's "theory" of pursuing gradual reforms in the present bourgeois state structure through parliamentary means.
9) Nasakom is an acronym derived from Nasionalis, Agama, Komunis (Nationalism, Religion, Communism). Sukarno put this forward as representing the unity of what he said were the three major groupings in Indonesia: the nationalists, religious believers and the communists.
10) Pantjasila were the five "principles" proclaimed by Sukar- no as the basis for the bourgeois state of Indonesia: belief in god, nationalism, humanism, social justice, people's sovereignty.
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