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Stichting Vrij Oost Timor (Free East Timor Foundation)
Rory
Innes-Mills and Endie van Binsbergen
Election Day, August 30, 2001
First of all, we wish to compliment all those East Timorese people for their tremendous patience, standing waiting under the hot sun for many hours, to bring out their votes. We congratulate the national observer groups for the high number of observers that they were able to send into the field despite the obvious shortage of transportation and practical means of communication.
We also wish to express our happiness on the peaceful process on Election Day. However, we made some observations that we feel we need to share, hoping that this report may contribute to the improvement of electoral procedures.
Observations and recommendations
Polling centres visited in Uato Lari sub-district: Makadiki, Mata
Hoi and Babulo. Polling centres visited in Viqueque sub-district:
Lugasa, Raitahu, Karau Balo and Beobe.
Opening time of the polling centres
We heard over the CivPol radio that Makadiki polling centre opened
at 07.38.
We observed the opening of Mata Hoi polling centre at 07.45.
Sealing the ballot boxes
We found in two polling centres that the ballot box seals were
being applied incorrectly and in such a way as to allow them to be
easily opened, after severe difficulties closing. Later, at the
counter centre, we observed that more ballot boxes had been sealed
this incorrect way. For a full report see annex 1 RReport on
Misapplication of Ballot Box Seals..
Recommandation:
One approach is to question whether the IEC staff were adequately
instructed on how to use the seals correctly. It is our believe,
however, that if something can go wrong it will.
We believe there is a design fault with these seals. It should not be possible to apply the seals incorrectly. We recommend a different type of seals, constructed in such a manner that only one way of application is possible.
Security and crowd control
We observed at one polling centre how the public pushed forward to
such an extent that the head of the queue was standing inside the
polling station.
We observed unauthorised staff within a restricted area at a
polling centre. They identified themselves as vvillage security..
Security staff (Policia) referred to them as ppembantu (helpers)
and insisted that they were not a problem. See annex 2 SSecurity
and crowd control at Mata Hoi polling centre..
The public at Mata Hoi polling centre broke en masse through the
barrier tape at the lateness of opening. See annex 2 SSecurity and
crowd control at Mata Hoi polling centre..
Observed the entire polling staff at one polling station get up and
leave their positions in order to observe a disturbance outside.
This left one of our observers and a party agent alone with a room
full of voting materials for about three minutes.
Recommendation:
We recommend that the Electoral Officers consider the existing
structure of security in the villages/areas, as to make it possible
to incorporate this structure, through communication with the
village chiefs and the local police. We realise that the village
security structure may well be in the hands of one particular
political party. Another suggestion would be that IEC recruits more
local crowd control staff at the larger polling centres.
As to security inside the polling stations, we believe it is a matter of clear instructions and supervising by the electoral officer to insure that polling staff stay at their positions to secure the polling material.
Securing voters and voting booths
We observed polling staff and party agents standing or sitting in
such a position that they were able to see voters making their
selection.
Observed a party agent chatting with polling staff while flipping
through the book with names of voters, not wearing his ID-badge
(kept it in his pocket).
In two polling centres voting booths had been positioned in such
manner that public was able to look in through the windows. The
construction of the voting booths did not seem to be deep enough to
secure privacy for voters. At many polling centres two (or more)
booths were positioned on one line, near each other. As these
booths were not quite deep a simple move allowed a voter to see
what the voter in the next booth was voting for.
Observed speed-markers (felt-tip pens) being used in the voting
booths at a polling centre in Uato Lari sub-district. These are
likely to leach and stain, possibly invalidating the ballot
paper.
Recommendation:
Electoral officers need to periodically check the entire polling
stations on all possible irregularities. This includes that voting
booths need to be checked on missing or introduced materials. Pens
or nails missing from the booth and/or political propaganda being
written or posted inside the booth is likely to disturb voters in
their act.
We recommend that both the position of and the material inside the booth is tested on functioning before the opening of the polling centre. Do not provide material that is likely to spoil a ballot. We also recommend a deeper model of voting booth, to secure the privacy of the voters.
Application and checking of invisible ink
At Raitahu polling centre we observed poling staff applying the
invisible ink to the thumbs of voters instead of the index finger.
On reporting this, the DEO replied that he had instructed his staff
to do so and that he wished to continue this.
At several polling centres polling staff were not using the black
light to check for previous application of invisible ink.
Recommandation:
Double-check if instructions are clearly understood by Electoral
Officers and insure that DEOss pay adequate attention to training
and supervising the polling staff.
ID-badges
Observed two different types of the yellow party agent ID-badges;
one with IEC logo clearly visible and one type no logo at all. This
second type was also not laminated and it was hard to determine
whether these were true or false. We had not received any
information from IEC on these different types of ID-badges. An
international IEC staff reported to us that he also had not been
made aware of these different types of party agent badges and that
he was confused by this.
In addition we wish to point out that some problems had occurred
also with the observers badges, before the date of the elections.
Distribution was late and the IEC logo printed prominently in the
middle of the badge made it hard to be identified as independent
observers while working in the field. See annex 3: OObserver
badges..
Recommendation:
As it is not only important for polling staff but also for the
public that observers and party agents are clearly identified, we
recommend a bigger size of badge than the presently used. We also
recommend that the terms PParty agent and OObserver are prominently
printed on the badge, in the requested languages, to avoid
misinterpretations.
National observers
Some national observers in Uato Lari sub-district were doing the
work of polling staff, helping people who were checking their names
on the voter roll.
Two of the above national observers were actually guiding voters
into the polling stations and were writing names of voters from
their registration cards.
In one polling station we observed a national observer sitting
right next to the ballot boxes, watching the ballot papers.
Recommendation:
We observed many national observers doing a good job in the field
and we were happy with these East Timorese colleagues. However, we
believe that training and information should have been more
complete.
We recommend that the UNDP provides clear manuals on all stages of the electoral process -in the required languages- for each national observer. This may need some consideration on the cultural and historical background of the national observers.
Also, a transparent insight in the mandate of the IEC would enable both national and international observers to identify what requires observation.
Counting Centre Viqueque
August 31 until September 3, 2001
The counting centre in Viqueque was situated at the UNTAET Head Quarters. Here, the ballot papers were sorted and counted in two lines; one for the national parties and one for the district candidates. The entire process took four days to be finished.
Observations and recommendations
Irregularities in material
Observed at the counting centre that even more ballot boxes then we
spotted on Election Day occurred to have been sealed incorrectly
and verbally reported this to the Viqueque CEO. One of our
observers was then asked by the CEO to immediately (August 31,
10:25) write and submit a report on the incorrectly applied seals.
See annex 1: RReport on Misapplication of Ballot Box Seals..
Observed that in fact a high number of ballot papers had been
marked by using a speed-marker/felt pen. This often led to leaching
and smudging of the mark onto several areas of the ballot paper.
This, in turn, let to confusion on a correct and fair ruling on
these particular ballot papers. See above: EElection Day, August
30, 2001 - Securing voters and voting booths.O
Observed many stubs (numbers of the ballot papers) still attached
to ballot papers. This enables tracing the origin of these votes.
Several IEC staff seemed to be ignorant to this and we observed
that the CEO repeatedly needed to instruct staff to remove these
stubs.
We observed several misprinted ballot papers with double printed
-and therefore changed- colours of the party symbols/flags. This
may well lead to confusion of the voter.
Sorting
Observed what we consider to be an acceptable number of simple
mistakes made in regard to counting votes. For example a vote for
party A was judged as such but then placed on the pile for Party B,
etc.
Observed what we consider to be an unnecessarily high number of
mistakes made due to the unclear labelling of sorting boxes.
Observed on many occasions ballot papers being placed in the
iinvalid sorting box instead of the ppossibly invalid sorting box.
The sorting boxes were in fact the cut-off bases of water bottle
cartons with hand-written labels.
Observed IEC staff returning from lunch break in shifts repeating
the mistakes that had just been corrected, as they had not been
updated on the instructions.
Invalid ballot papers
Observed an unusual high number of completely blank votes. Observed
an unnecessarily high number of vvotes for IEC.. This is where a
mark or a hole was punched in the IEC logo either on the top front
of the ballot paper or on the stamp on the rear of the ballot
paper. The CEO stated that there were so many ppossible invalids
that the ruling was holding up the counting process.
Recommendation:
This was possibly due to insufficient civic/voter education but may
also be due to the design of the ballot paper and stamp.
It should not be possible to vote for anything but a party or a
candidate. We believe that changing the design of the ballot paper
and stamp may avert misunderstanding.
Educational material for voters needs to be widespread and
information needs to be publicly posted in all (sub-) villages.
Example, there hardly any publicly posted examples of the ballot
papers in Beloi, except near the UNTAET Head Quarters.
We strongly recommend timely and intensive civic/voter education, as to allow people to prepare themselves.
Communication with party agents and observers
Observed on several occasions that announcements were made (on
rulings, etc) in English only, leaving many national observers and
party agents mystified as to the nature of the announcement.
There seemed to be no effort made by IEC staff to make public (i.e.
post on the notice board) the criteria used to rule on ppossibly
invalid votes. This led to much confusion and debate amongst
observers and party agents.
Observed that party agents seemed unclear on the procedure for
challenging the validity of a vote (or if they even had the right
to query a vote). This quickly led to confusion and frustration and
even anger directed towards IEC staff.
National observers informed us that they had no manuals on the
counting process.
Observed that IEC staff was receptive and open to any votes that
were queried by international observers but were less likely to
listen to or even notice the queries of national observers and
party agents. At times this boarded on plain rudeness.
Example: We observed a party agent attempting to question the
sorting of the ballot papers. Instead of answering the agentss
question, the CEO responded by physically ordering all party agents
and observers to remove themselves from the sorting tables. While
doing this, the CEO stated that she did not wish to have to report
that ballot papers were missing because of party agents or
observers being too near the sorting boxes. We considered this to
be unnecessarily rude and offensive. The CEO initially ignored the
agentss question, until made aware of this by an international
observer.
Transparancy
The sorting of ballots was done behind the sorting boxes and stacks
of sorted ballot papers were placed at once into the sorting boxes,
causing difficulties in observing the sorting.
Observed a party agent complain to the CEO about not being able to
witness/react on the ruling on possible invalid votes.
Observed the CEO making rulings on ppossibly invalid votes with her
back to observers and party agents thereby blocking any view of the
ballot papers. When questioned as to why she was doing this she
replied that it was necessary to do it this way tto keep the people
from getting too close to the papers..
Observed two national observers requesting a recheck on a ruled
ballot. After the recheck by the CEO, an IEC staff replaced the
ballot under a sorted pile, taking it out of sight.
Recommendation:
Position the sorting boxes with some space between them, allowing
good view on the sorting.
Insure that all IEC staff are aware of the need for transparency in
the entire process.
*Rory Innes-Mills and Endie van Binsbergen*
Annex 1: Report on Misapplication of Ballot Box Seals
Rory Innes-Mills Free East Timor Foundation IEC 0447
August 30, 2001
Matahoi Polling Center 6:45
Observed that polling staff had difficulty sealing polling boxes.
Observed polling staff breaking the end of a seal tab to facilitate
its entry into the lock section of the seal.
Ballot box 0683 seal number 536447 would not seal. This was
reported to the DEO and she saw that it was replaced with seal
536441. She asked for this incident to be noted in her notebook.
This was done.
At around 8:10, I was asked to transport a National Observer to
Babulo on my motorbike and I did so. While I was away from Matahoi
my partner Endie also from Free East Timor Foundation IEC 0046
checked a number of other boxes and they were also found to have
seals that would not lock. The numbers of these boxes and seals
were recorded by Endie but they are not available to me at the time
of writing this report.
At Babulo the DEO reported that there were no problems with the seals.
Lugasa Polling Center 10:45
On arrival the DEO mentioned that she had also experienced
problems with the seals. The Canadian CivPol member (Robert)
present mentioned that on at least one occasion he had to use his
multi-tool to pull the tab through the lock. While at Lugasa
Polling Center I met the Viqueque CEO and mentioned my observations
regarding the seals to her. She made a note of my observations in
her note book.
Raitahu Polling Center 13:50
When asked if he had experienced problems with the seals the DEO
replied that he had had no problems at all with the seals. I asked
an IEC staff member (Angelo Rangel UN Identification) to
demonstrate to me how he had applied the seals (this was done on a
spare seal). The procedure of applying the seal seemed to be very
smooth and easy. After some experimentation with other spare seals
I realized that there was in fact two ways to apply the seals: a
correct way and an incorrect way.
Beobe Polling Center 15:45
When asked if he had experienced problems with the seals the DEO
replied that he had had no problems at all with the seals. I
checked the seals at this polling center for incorrect application
and there was found to be no problems.
August 31, 2001
UNTAET Viqueque 04:00 (approx.)
Our Field Report was sent to the office of the Coordinator of
Observers and also to our organization (Free East Timor
Foundation). This report contained the observations noted above and
also other observations (e.g. polling staff not using black light
to check for dye application, etc)
Viqueque Counting Center 16:00
Entered and observed the opening of ballot boxes. At around
closing time (time not noted) ballot box 1102 from polling center
238 (recorded in my field notes as 328 but this may well be wrong)
was placed on the table for opening and sorting. The seals (
529673, 529674, 529675) on this box were checked by me and all were
found to be incorrectly applied. It was decided by the IEC staff
that it was late and time to finish the sorting. The ballot box was
consequently removed from the table and returned to the area
containing unopened boxes.
September 1, 2001
Viqueque Counting Center 08:25.
Observed the opening of ballot boxes. From polling center 239,
ballot box 1103 (seals 529671, 529672, 529676) and ballot box 0726
(seals 536544, 53646, 53643) were found to have been incorrectly
applied.
Other ballot boxes that were opened in my presence (ballot box
numbers 1119,1104, 1114, 1088, 0991, 0849) were found to have
correctly applied seals.
09:00 talked with Viqueque CEO about my views on seals and their use. She asked me to include this in our report to her.
10:00 walked around the ballot boxes waiting to be opened and noticed several with misapplied seals. I was reprimanded by IEC staff for being in a restricted area and left the restricted area immediately
10:25 Asked by Viqueque CEO make a report concerning the seals ASAP and submit it to her.
Conclusion
There is a problem with the seals. It is possible to apply them incorrectly. Once applied incorrectly the seal can be easily opened (and resealed correctly or incorrectly).
One approach is to question whether the IEC staff were adequately instructed on how to use the seals correctly.
It is my belief, however, that if something can go wrong it will. I believe there is a design fault with these seals. It should not be possible to apply the seals incorrectly.
Rory Innes-Mills 01/09/01
Annex 2: Security and crowd control at Mata Hoi
Endie van Binsbergen, IEC 0446
Stichting Vrij Oost Timor (Free East Timor Foundation)
From field report 30-08-2001:
06.45: Arrived at Mata Hoi
07.23: Noticed a group of civilians gathering inside the
polling centre and asked them who they were. They answered: WWe are
village security.. Then asked the Timorese police present why these
people were inside. The police replied that these were helpers,
friends.
Reported this to CivPol and the DEO. The latter took immediate
action and asked CivPol to remove these people. Mentioned group of
people left reluctantly.
07.37: Crowd increasing, over 1000 people waiting outside the restricted area. Polling centre had not opened yet.
07.45: Polling staff at Mata Hoi started casting their votes, followed by the observers.
07.55: Security were unable to stop people from creeping into the restricted area. First groups of voters entered and formed queues while the crowd was getting restless at the lateness of opening.
08.06: First voters entered the polling stations to cast their votes.
08.15: Push and pull between security and crowd behind the barrier tape.
08.23: Total loss of crowd control. The crowd broke through barrier tape and moved en masse into the polling centre.
09.00: Although most people inside the polling centre formed queues, several people were walking about and looking into the windows of the polling stations. Once the crowd had settled inside the polling centre there was no sign of a threatening situation. Observed that civilians supported the queue control, identified some of them as part of the group mentioned above.
Conclusion:
Although the group that supported the crowd control was unauthorised to do so, they seemed to manage quite well to control the crowd into the areass set up for queuing. It occurred to me that the CivPol, East Timorese Policia and the appointed staff for crowd control were unable to manage without these people.
Although the village security structure may well be in the hands of one particular political party, I recommend that Electoral Officers consider the existing structure of security in the villages/areas, as to make it possible to incorporate this structure, through communication with the village chiefs and the local police.
Another suggestion would be that IEC recruits more local crowd control staff at the larger polling centres.
Endie van Binsbergen 4/9/01
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