I propose a different reading of these new forces, in terms of the history and theory of universalisitic movements. I use this term to cover trans-societal social movements with universalising ideologies and ambitions. I would include under it at least religious universalism, bourgeois liberal cosmopolitanism, labour and socialist internationalism and the radical-democratic global solidarity movements of the present day. I do this because I see these as successive waves, arising from, but both surpassing and including previous ones. So religious universalisms still exist today, on a range from the totalitarian and fundamentalist to the radical-democratic and pluralist tendencies. I here concentrate, however, on the last of the two universalist movements listed above, the mass labour and socialist internationalisms of the 19th-20th centuries, and the not-yet-mass radical-democratic global solidarity ones of the 20th-21st.

Socialist and labour internationalism did not die out like the dodo: they were consumed by the fires of nation-statism, imperialism and consumer capitalism. They have contributed little to the new internationalisms, consigning themselves to sectarian sidestreams, or being dismissed and ignored by the proud and the new - and the chroniclers of such. Yet, according to my reading, the new movements, active on the global terrain, proposing global alternatives, represent a phoenix rising from the ashes of earlier capitalist conflagrations (with these extending from, shall we say, 1914 to 1968? 1989?). This phoenix needs to remember the fire, if it is not, in its turn, to be consumed by the fire of a globalised and informatised capitalism. The latter offers its own opportunities, dangers and - above all - seductions. I would argue that the new global social movements will not be able to carry out the modest but necessary tasks assigned them in the new literature if they do not have a broader sense of where they come from, and a utopian vision of an alternative to capitalism.

In explaining such matters this paper will be largely theoretical or conceptual. I first set out my general argument (Part 2). I consider classical Marxist theory of the international and internationalism (Part 3). I propose my own understanding of internationalism in the era of globalisation (Part 4). I conclude with consideration of some implications - including those for labour and socialist internationalism (Part 5).

2. General argument: from national places to global spaces; from organisations to networks

In the 20th century, strategies based on this understanding led to the creation of societies marked by an extreme statism in both national and international policy. This process occurred not only after both world wars, but also - in analogous manner - following the collapse of colonialism. The states coming out of these transformations, which were always supported by internationalist movements, in no way surpassed capitalism, nationally or internationally, but merely remained on its periphery, to eventually achieve full or partial reinstatement, or to have this thrust upon them.

For the 21st century, it seems to me, it is both possible and necessary to have an alternative concept, drawing on the 19th and 20th century values of liberty, equality and solidarity, but 1) recognising the increasing limits on the autonomy, authority and legitimacy of the state in the contemporary world, 2) related to the transformation of global space rather than - or as well as - the national place, 3) allowing for a multiplicity of global contradictions, subjects and movements, 4) adding to the lay trinity the values of diversity, peace and ecological care, and 5) insisting on the interrelation of a) global utopias, in the sense of imaginable humane global communities, and b) the immediate necessity of civilising a capitalist world order that threatens not so much that order itself as the existence of the human species. Let us expand this argument a little.
 
 

The 19th and 20th century values: Liberty, equality and - as it was then called - fraternity, were the lay trinity of the French Revolution. That they were or became figleaves for capitalist, industrialist, nationalist, imperial, eurocentric, racist, patriarchal, militarist and even consumerist projects and ideologies, does not mean that they should be identified with or abandoned to such. Liberty, Equality and Solidarity had and have a popular and democratic resonance, and an emancipatory potential. They also have a contemporary worldwide appeal that socialism, for example, has largely lost. The trinity can and needs to be re-articulated for the conditions of an increasingly globalised and informatised/service capitalism.
 
 

Recognising the increasing limits on the state: For one hundred years or more the state has been understood as almost synonymous with both `society' and `politics', in both academic and popular discourse. Today the nation-state, or state-nation, is being increasingly challenged not only from above and outside, by a dynamic, capital-driven, globalisation, but also from `below' from sub- or cross-national places (sub-national regions, cross-frontier ethnicities), and from or by spaces that are super-territorial (the newly-proposed international court) or non-territorial (in the sense, for example, of a growing community of environmentalists, or women).
 
 

The transformation of global space: Space has been previously understood largely in terms of territorial place, particularly in the development of the state-nation, of imperialism or `spheres of influence', and for the operation of nationally-based and nationally-dependent capitalists. Place matters. But capitalism, in its electronic and computerised forms, increasingly operates in a cyberspace that crosses, surrounds and penetrates territorial places that are increasingly unable to defend themselves by Chinese or Berlin Walls, by bans and censorship, or by appeals to `national sovereignty' (the last refuge of authoritarians?). Progressive and humanistic forces and voices are increasingly recognising that defence of national or ethnic variety, or of threatened places, requires activity in global spaces, including cyberspace. There may still be a `national question’ but the answer, if it is to be both radical and democratic, must be a global one.
 
 

Allowing for a multiplicity of contradictions, subjects, movements: In the 19th and 20th centuries both liberalism and socialism have been simplifying, serialising and reductive, whether in terms of a standardised voting citizen or a class-conscious proletarian. Contemporary globalised capitalism is capable of simultaneous standardisation (the `world car') and of at least consumptive variation (`niche products', `glocalisation', local or ethnic advertising). Progressive forces are learning that it is variety and variation that provides for survival-capacity in times of rapid and continuing global change, and that this kind of variety relates not to `consumer choice' but to human and ecological creativity and adaptability. Freedom is decreasingly understood as `the recognition of necessity', but of the possibility of questioning, challenging and even changing `necessity'.
 
 

The values of diversity and care: These follow from the above, with care suggesting responsibilities not only in the present but respect for the past and responsibility for the future.
 
 

The inter-relation of immediate survival and eventual utopia: Strategies for immediate survival can no longer be successful if they ignore or threaten social or geographical Others (increasingly informed of such threats or dangers by mainstream television or alternative email). Utopias can no longer represent `the world turned upside down', since too many people have paid the price of such apocalyptical experiments, whether in Russia, Cambodia or the squatter settlements of Lima. Increasingly needed are local/global survival strategies informed by utopian thinking, and utopian alternatives based on or informed by survival struggles.
 
 

The surpassing, finally, of the old internationalism, is different from either ignoring or dismissing it. The old internationalism was not evil, nor are the new ones virtuous. The reproduction by the new internationalism of many of the shortcomings of the old is certainly due to either ignorance, amnesia, or feelings of moral superiority - for all of which a price is exacted. 
 
 

3. The social theory and utopian ideology of classical socialist internationalism
 
 

The two documents are complementary in a number of ways. The first one is philosophical, the second political. The first deals with the global level, the second with that of the nation-state. The first deals with communism primarily as historical transformation and social movement, the latter with it as programme and organisation. The first document could be seen as reflective and theoretical, the latter as persuasive and utopian. Although I am here comparing and contrasting, this is not with the intention of praising the `theoretical' over the `utopian' one. Both combine rational-analytical and utopian-prophetic elements - a combination surely essential to any emancipatory social theory. Whilst Marx and Marxism have an ambiguous attitude towards utopianism, contemporary libertarian socialism, feminism and ecological movements have refamiliarised socialists with the necessity of an appeal to emotion, desire, and imagination in challenging the myriad inhumanities, indignities and banalities to which we are accustomed. I find these documents amazing and moving, dated in significant ways, yet nonetheless capable of throwing light 150 years forward and therefore worthy of the critical attention not simply of contemporary socialists but all democratically-minded people. I will interrogate the texts both for their main themes and their contemporary resonances and lacunae.
 
 

Communism as international social movement
 
 

Let us examine first the passage from the German Ideology of 1845-6:
 
 

The international nature of the conditions for overcoming alienation. The contradiction between the propertylessness of the `great mass of humanity' and an `existing world of wealth and culture' has been increasing since Marx' time. This has, however, been not only, and certainly not simply, in the form of a contradiction between capital and proletariat. We are witness to processes of mass proletarianisation (deprival of means of production) without creation of a majority proletariat, of situations in which it is a privileged minority of the proletarianised that becomes - or remains - a permanent proletariat. We are witness to deepening contradictions between worlds of wealth and culture and those denied this, today both between and within `creditor' and `debtor' states. We are cognisant of a continuing or even increasing coincidence of propertylessness with female or minority (ethnic, religious) status. So this truly international contradiction has been accompanied not with a growing homogenisation of the propertyless but a continuing heterogenisation and one that is repeatedly restructured.
 
 

For Marx, the development of these international contradictions required such an increase in productive power and wealth that their resolution would permit a surpassing of want, destitution and a struggle for necessities. The computer-based technical revolution now advancing in the industrialised capitalist world is capable of ensuring rising productivity and full employment with a decrease in labour time. Although this development opens up the potentiality for overcoming the `old filthy business' we know, of course, that it is currently being used to further fragment (industrially/occupationally), segment (by nationality, gender, ethnicity, religion) and stratify the propertyless.
 
 

For Marx, it was the above process that would ensure two crucial conditions, the `empirical existence of men in their world-historical, instead of local being' and the making of `each nation dependent upon the revolutions of the others'. On the one hand, the absence of the earlier-mentioned requirements explains why the latter conditions have not yet come about. On the other hand, we can empirically identify the growth of these two processes. Increasing numbers of movements demonstrate mass awareness of global community. And we cannot but note the increasing demonstration effect of national revolutions or uprisings, student protest movements, or even social reform waves.
 
 

The proletariat and communism as only existing internationally. That what we have so far witnessed are increasingly national proletariats and increasingly national communisms is accepted by more and more Marxists. There is, however, the temptation to escape from this leaden empirical contingency to the nebulous freedom of theory: the proletariat and communism do not yet fully exist because they have forgotten or never learned what Marx pronounced: but one day they will. Since neither historical nor contemporary social analysis reveals much evidence for such an assertion, we are left dependent on faith in an existing doctrine and ultimate authority - something orthodox Marxists reject in all other cases. I propose a radical solution: that we take Marx' position here as figurative rather than literal. It is clear why he attached his aspiration for the end of human alienation to the proletariat - the new, modern, mass, international class of the exploited and oppressed. I propose we should here take `proletariat' as a metaphor for all the alienated, all those denied their past rights, their present capacities, their future potential (this does not, of course, mean we should or could do this wherever Marx refers to the proletariat). For the increasing internationalism of those alienated in many different ways there is increasing evidence and argumentation. That the overcoming of alienation (`communism' in Marx' language) is inconceivable nationally, is surely demonstrated by the collapse of `socialism' not only in one country but also in one bloc. Increasing `interdependence', moreover, seems to imply that you cannot today build, or preserve, even a capitalist welfare state in just one country. My interpretation, further, implies neither writing off the proletariat as an autonomous contributor to internationalism, nor abandoning appeals from outside or above (or below) that it consider the advantages and even the necessities of a global identity. It means only abandonment of any assumption that its internationalism is structurally determined and/or exemplary. On this understanding, the proletariat would also have to go to school, and not so much with Marx (or me) as with the other alienated categories. It would also have to opt for the untrodden but exhilarating world of internationalism rather than the familiar, well-trodden but imprisoning parish of nation-statism. The proletariat may still have a world to win, but it also has more than its chains to lose.
 
 

Communism as the real social movement. Here I feel we have a thought-provoking theoretical formulation since it invites us to question its own formulator and its social forms. Communism has long been for the world primarily a `state of affairs' - an affair of Communist states. It has also always been largely an `ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself', increasingly an ideal in the heads only of socialist intellectuals, (who could thus be fairly named `idealist socialist intellectuals'). If communism is meant in the first instance to be `the real movement which abolishes the present state of things', then this requires us to address ourselves to such real movements (movements in the sense both of societal transformation and mass feelings, ideas, organisation and action). The real movements that are presently transforming the international order are the new alternative social movements. These do not have to be understood as replacing or in opposition to the labour movement. Amongst the real movements could also be counted the `social movement unions' or `new social unionism' that explicitly or implicitly, to a greater or lesser extent, for a longer or shorter period, surpass the economism and politicism, the reformist or insurrectionary workerism, of their predecessors.
 
 

The necessity for simultaneous revolution by the dominant nations. The importance of this assertion is what it reveals to us of Marx' apocalypticism and eurocentrism. The latter was not so much surpassed as by-passed by Lenin's notion of the weak link, and by Trotsky's of uneven and combined development. What they understood, because Russia experienced it, is that the international spread of capitalist social relations is multi-faceted and uneven in essence. But this does not imply, as it did in part for Lenin and increasingly for some of his followers, that we can shift revolutionary primacy from `advanced' to `backward' nations, or revolutionary agency from the anti-capitalist proletariat of the industrialised centre to the anti-imperialist masses of the agricultural periphery. It rather requires us to abandon any idea of countries or blocs or parties that are either industrial/cultural models or revolutionary vanguards. Recognising the differential implications and experience of capitalist internationalisation requires us to: 1) identify the similar structures, processes and experiences in different countries that lend themselves to common internationalist action: 2) recognise that differential position and experience within an increasingly capitalist world order implies different movement priorities, discoveries, inventions and achievements; and 3) work out principles and forms of solidarity amongst and between the different significant movements of particular countries or blocs (e.g. both peace movement with peace movement and labour movement with women's movement). Finally, we need to ask ourselves why Marx had an apocalyptical vision of emancipation. I here suggest that apocalypticism is a requirement of a mass emancipatory ideology or movement in a situation in which masses of people are capable of rebelling against existing conditions but not of fully conceiving or controlling a desired alternative. I will further suggest that the masses today are potentially capable of doing the latter, which is why apocalyptical visions and strategies are associated with early, undeveloped or (self-)isolated socialist movements (Sendero Luminoso in Peru, the Communist Party of the Philippines, both inspired by Maoism). Visions of sudden and complete transformation to a land of milk and honey, where `the people will rule' (as in the original African National Congress Charter), are declining in the more sophisticated socialist movements of the Third World, such as those of South Korea, South Africa and Brazil. This does not, of course, mean that apocalyptical visions are absent amongst large parts of the masses locally. Contemporary political apocalypticism, for the rest, appears increasingly a characteristic of reactionary, militaristic and obscurantist forces (religious fundamentalists, chauvinist nationalists, racists, global militarists).
 
 

The existence of the premises for communism. The reason why, almost 150 years later, these premises have not yet translated themselves into either empirical international reality, or even mass internationalist aspiration, has been sufficiently argued above.
 
 

What will happen in the absence of the necessary conditions. The value of this passage lies not only in its quite remarkable prescience but also in reminding us that such prescience is the outcome of a new theoretical approach linked with new emancipatory struggles (compare contemporary feminist or ecological theory). Marx says that if the conditions are not ripe, capitalism and the market will continue to appear `home-bred conditions surrounded by superstition'. He also says that the further extension of the world market will `abolish local communism'. What we have, of course, witnessed over the last century and a half is working-class advances within capitalist states (by nationally self-defined workers, without or against others), and of anti-capitalist revolutions being repeatedly penetrated, de-radicalised and restricted by the dynamic growth of international capital. What we have so far witnessed internationally have, in other words, been working-class movements within, or national revolutions against, capitalism. Surpassing capitalism is another matter entirely.
 
 

Communism as international political movement
 
 

We turn now to the Communist Manifesto of 1848. Certainly the best-remembered part of this are the closing words, `Workers of all countries, unite!'. But the Manifesto does not give so much place to internationalisation and internationalism as memory might suggest. What it does have to say is, of course, determinant for the Manifesto as a whole. Within it I identify three main elements, once again re-arranged for purposes of analysis and discussion.
 
 

1. Bourgeois internationalisation as progressive. Whilst it is evident that Marx and Engels by no means identify themselves with the bourgeoisie, they clearly consider its international role as progressive, as modernising, developing, homogenising and unifying the world. The violent `pain of extinction' with which the bourgeoisie threatens `barbarian and semi-barbarian' nations is presented as civilising. The bourgeoisie is even credited with undermining `national one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness' and of creating a `world literature'. It is hardly necessary, in the face of the last century and a half, to criticise this picture. Nor is it necessary to argue the linkage between the attitudes here expressed and those of European bourgeois racism, evolutionism, modernism and cosmopolitanism. This has been done extensively and convincingly elsewhere. What is necessary is to stress what is missing, since this helps us to understand why internationalisation has not led to internationalism: why industrialism is not merely disruptive but destructive, why the bourgeoisie is chauvinist and imperialist, why capitalist statism is essentially militaristic, why world capitalist civilisation is essentially individualising and divisive. Far from creating its own international and internationalist gravedigger in the industrial proletariat, for example, capitalism has divided the labour process of gravedigging technically, socially and geographically, assigning different parts of the task to the differentially proletarianised, of various gender, ethnic or religious categories, under diverse political and labour regimes. In addition to a world literature, it has created a commercialised transnational culture which simultaneously provides immense profits, homogenises audiences as consumers, spreads dehumanised bourgeois values, erodes local popular cultures containing elements of resistance or opposition and finally obstructs any such communication between these as would be necessary for the creation of an internationalist culture.
 
 

To add all the above is to qualify, not reverse, the evaluation. For it is, for example, equally evident that the development of railways and other technical channels of communication were determinant in the rapid organisation of labour nationally and internationally. An interesting and important question follows. If the railways thus allowed labour organisation, did they not, perhaps, also restrict its shape? Railways are physically-fixed, monopolistically or state-owned, hierarchically managed, centripetal channels. Their international connections mechanically connect the separate nationally-owned and controlled systems. Did not national and international labour organisations unconsciously reproduce the pattern, structure and management of such industries? Capitalist industrialisation and internationalisation is, in any case, a highly contradictory phenomenon, simultaneously denying, provoking and even stimulating possibilities for self-organisation and liberation. The effective use of computers in both individualistic sabotage of the computer society, or in collective struggle against it, would be one example. Another would be the radical recycling of the white, North American individualist Superman myth by the apparition in Mexico of Superbarrio, the protector of urban squatters, who - tongue firmly in cheek (he is a cheeky fellow) - states that he draws his power only from the collective. Superbarrio operates amongst Latinos/as in both Mexico and the US, declaring `We didn't make the border, we don't want the border' .
 
 

2. The proletariat as a liberated, liberating and internationalist subject. The proletariat is endowed with positive and universalistic qualities. It is free of `every trace of national character' and `bourgeois prejudices'. The workers `have no country', they `have nothing to lose but their chains'. They have to complete the task begun by the bourgeoisie. By ending class antagonisms within countries they will end them between countries. And they must end them first within nations, become the leading class within the nation, become the nation. Although these phrases come from different parts of the Manifesto, they nonetheless amount to a clear argument: since the proletariat is free of bourgeois and nationalist prejudices, since it is free of any stake in existing society, it can therefore put an end to conflicts between nations, this requiring that it first take over the nation-state from the old ruling classes that are responsible for international conflicts.
 
 

In considering this view, it is necessary to make a number of points.
 
 

Firstly, the positive, progressive and Promethean characteristics the working class is here accorded have little or no correspondence with the early-19th century British proletariat as described by Engels four years earlier. In later political dealings with, and writings on, the British working class, its leaders and organisations, Marx and Engels identified national and stratum privilege, narrow self-interest, subordination to bourgeois ideas and institutions, and chauvinism. 
 
 

Secondly, the argument is class-reductionist in assuming that state and nation are forms of existence, or expressions, of classes, or of secondary import to classes in determining social liberation. It would seem superfluous today to have to argue for the continuing, indeed growing, weight of state and nationality/ethnicity in determining relations between people and peoples. The commonly tense and sometimes violent relations between and within even culturally close Communist states - and the longstanding state discrimination against ethnic or religious minorities within them - was evidently due to these forces. In the late-l970s, the Polish regime was characterised by one prescient critic as `Ethno-Communist'. As the Communism has disappeared, it is often only ethnicity that seems to remain.
 
 

Thirdly, the argument is evolutionist in suggesting that the proletariat has to complete a task begun by the bourgeoisie rather than to criticise and transform all bourgeois relations and processes.
 
 

Fourthly, the argument is `stageist' in so far as it suggests that national struggle somehow proceeds the international one, or that international conflicts cannot be ended without proletarian rule nationally. This implies a priority of struggles, or an order of separate levels, at odds with the 1847 document and with a dialectical understanding of inter-penetrating and mutually-determining national and international spheres.
 
 

Fifthly, the argument is, of course, patriarchal. At a time when a large part of factory labour was carried out by women and children, the proletariat is assumed to consist of adult males - who presumably neither beat, rape, nor more-subtly oppress, their family members.
 
 

Given, in sum, the complex nature of both the 19th and 20th-century proletariat, given the complexity of social structures within which it existed and exists, the portrayal of the proletariat as a liberated, liberating and vanguard internationalist subject is precisely an `ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself'.
 
 

3. The communist role: The only thing that distinguishes communists from other working-class parties is that within national struggles they press the common interests of the proletariat internationally, and that at any stage they press the interests of the movement generally. The conclusion to the last section applies here with equal force. The aspiration represented by the Marx-Engels assertion has evidently been disappointed by the nationalisation and statification of socialists and socialism. Once again, however, we have to abandon dependence on a Second Coming, a Last Really International. We cannot today see, even in such internationalist traditions as those of the Trotskyists or Anarcho-Syndicalists, the embryo of a body which is not only internationalist but also possessed of the other characteristics required by the Manifesto - that it be not opposed to other working-class parties, that it be not separate from the proletariat, that it have no sectarian principles.
 
 

In their concept of the role of communists, Marx and Engels combined traditional religious notions of salvation (an Elect, possessing the Word, leading the Chosen People, via an Apocalypse, to a Promised Land with the party - that was to become the quintessentially bourgeois form of political organisation! The power - or limitations - of this highly specific combination of forms (in relation to their ideal of a global movement to end human alienation) is witnessed by the way socialist parties have not so much failed to embody or further the project but have actually negated it. The two utopias socialist parties can offer us today are represented, I suppose, on the one hand by the West European `social market' society and, on the other, the `society of great harmony' which the terroristic Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) was trying to `drive home' into the minds of Peru's miserable but resilient masses. But these were or are either national or bloc projects. The Sendero type is one that is so inhuman, and implies such isolation from the world, that it has been abandoned by rulers or rejected by their subjects almost everywhere. And the social-market society, whilst still exercising attraction for some people in the East and the South, is one that cannot be reproduced internationally without despoiling the planet itself.
 
 

It is curious, finally, that the Manifesto, the more concrete and political of the two documents, should seem more dated or less relevant than the earlier, more abstract and philosophical one. This once again suggests that we have to liberate the project of internationalism from the politics of a 19th-century world dominated by the market, industrialisation, worker-capitalist conflict, nation- and empire-building, deification of the masculine and struggle for the control of the machinery of the state.
 
 

A parenthesis: the rise and fall of an old `new internationalism’
 
 

The Thirdworld(ist) internationalisms of the 1960s-70s deserve more than a footnote to the analysis of historical internationalism. We can certainly trace back their origins to the anti-imperialist, Pan-American (Bolivarista), Pan-African and other such internationalisms of earlier decades or centuries. Their post-WW2 revival in the 1950s-60s was due to the initiative of `non-aligned’ states (India, Indonesia, Ghana, Egypt), and then of state-oriented or state-initiated `peoples’ movements’, such as the Cuban-based Tricontinental, launched 1966. Such `regional’ or `particular’ internationalisms certainly had their popular appeal and may even have left a democratic political or ethical legacy (here we require research). But this cannot disguise their ideological/theoretical shortcomings. 
 
 

On the more ideological side we can consider the massive collection inspired by the Tricontinental, and entitled The Coming of the New International (Gerassi 1971). Not one of the 50 or so documents and declarations included actually addresses internationalism (as distinguished from anti-imperialism, national and social revolution). The word internationalism does not even have an index entry! The slippage from a socialist universalism to a radical-nationalist statism is here complete. Even when and where a thirdworldist internationalism did in fact take shape, as in the adventures of Che Guevara in the Congo and Bolivia, it was often limited to a relationship of revolutionary elites, and/or subject to the vagaries of Cuban foreign policy. Later Cuban, North Korean and Libyan `international solidarity’ projects took the form of military aid to authoritarian regimes, sabotage, espionage or terrorism. Even if inspired by the historical pan-continentalisms of Africa and Latin America, these projects had passed, before finding expression, through the prison schools of socialist and communist-state internationalism. 
 
 

The shortcomings of this new internationalism are identified more theoretically by Fernando Mires (1989). Mires sees it as reproducing, rather than surpassing, the logic of states and the `bloc internationalism' of the Soviet Union. He also sees it as reproducing the reductionism of the old internationalism, the practice of either ignoring all international contradictions but one, or of subordinating them to one `totalising antagonism' (proletarians/capitalists, Third World/First World). Mires nonetheless expresses the hope 1) that the crisis of thirdworldism will create the possibility for raising anti-imperialist positions on the basis of real and concrete antagonisms, and 2) that the crisis of internationalism might open up possibilities for the rise of forms of international cooperation free of determinism, and based not only on respect for similarities but also on that for differences.
 
 

So much for the inter-nationalism of the industrial, national and imperial period of capitalism. Whether, or to what extent, they created a legacy in the minds and actions of leftist intellectuals, activists and movement followers, in particular parts of the world, and were present at the birth of the new internationalisms, are matters - as I have suggested - requiring historical research. What remains clear, however, is that the new internationalisation, the new internationalism, requires new theory and new strategy. Let’s see if we can at least begin to imagine these.
 
 

4. Theorising internationalism in the era of globalisation
 
 

My convinction is that globalisation makes it possible, for the first time in human history, for emancipatory forces to at least begin to see the world both whole and holistically, to understand the interlocking of civilisation/barbarism and to propose understandings and strategies aimed directly at the civilising of global society. The `worldview’ offered below is just one of a number of attempts to do this.
 
 

Firstly, then, our present period is one of a complex, globalised, high-risk, information and service capitalism - a condition or moment not of post-modernity but of a high or radicalised modernity. Old social, economic, political, military, cultural and other conflicts are raised to higher levels (in terms of both intensity and sites), these being supplemented by new and truly global ones. The decentering of capitalist and statist power implies a dramatic increase in the number, type, complexity, sites and levels of social tension, conflict and negotiation. This is represented in Figure 1. An informatised capitalism is one in which society - or societies - are subjected simultaneously to increased scope or stretch and to increased intensity or deepening. This in turn implies increased interdependency, globalised localities and localised globalities, subjected to the simultaneous, complex and uneven effects of homogenisation and heterogenisation. This is, consequently, a world in which we are increasingly condemned to think both dialectically and ethically: dialectically because of the complexity and contradictions; ethically because our choices have sharply increasing socio-geographic and historical stretch and effect.
 
 

Secondly, globalisation and globalism, particularly in their neo-liberal form, provoke new political, social and cultural responses that are increasingly globalised. We can here identify three ideal-type responses: that of celebration (accepting the role of serialised global consumer, individualised voter), that of rejection (on particularistic, essentialist or fundamentalist grounds, whether religious, national, socialist or cultural) and that of critique/surpassal (coming primarily from the new alternative, or radical-democratic, social movements). This is represented in Figure 2. Figure 2a also suggests how the `alternative', local-to-global, response overlaps with/is penetrated by celebratory or rejectionist elements. Figure 2b reveals the tension between engagement and autonomy in alternative social movements/spaces, suggesting the necessity to move or balance between an excess of engagement with capital/state (incorporation) or of autonomy in civil society (self-isolation). Any `alternative' social movement, or related non-governmental organisation (NGO), can thus find itself in multiple positions, in local-to-global space, or at particular times. It is, for example, possible for a feminist movement, organisation or tendency (local-to-global) to be simultaneously self-isolated (within civil society, from other feminists or women, from men) and incorporated (into reform strategies or intermediating roles promoted by capital or state). A complex, interdependent, yet uneven and unbalanced global order, requires complex, interdependent global alternatives, which the alternative movements are beginning to offer. In so far as it is globalised, moreover, contemporary capitalism promotes communication and culture to increasing pre-eminence, this providing an eminently disputable terrain for such new emancipatory movements. Cultural globalisation makes an alternative global solidarity culture both necessary and possible. The form of the new global solidarity movements is, thus, increasingly that of `information internationalisms'.
 
 

Thirdly, globalisation implies the increasing centrality of the trans-, supra- or non-territorial terrain, as well as of global institutions, processes and instances, and therefore the possibility and necessity for the civilising of global society. Global civil society, understood as one created out of conflict with the capitalist and (inter-)state spheres, is a privileged terrain (not the sole one) for the construction of liberty, equality, solidarity, ecological care and cultural tolerance/creation. This is, however, not a paradise to be announced, discovered or inhabited, it is a habitat to be jointly constructed by autonomous, democratic and pluralist forces. This requires engagement with/in existing inter-state and transnational capitalist instances and processes. It also requires engagement with/in churches, religions, and within and between NGOs/social movements that often reproduce the structures and behaviours they claim to surpass. NGOs, as earlier suggested, can be found in any autonomous or ambiguous position within the `alternative' circle of Figure 2a and the `civil society' one Figure 2b. The development of a global civil society both depends on and stimulates the democratisation, deconcentration and decentralisation of inter-state organisations, transnational capitalist companies and religious institutions. A new concept of world citizenship is required to simultaneously synthesise and surpass those of the past. This would have as its utopian imaginary a citizenship without borders, classes or genders.
 
 

Fourthly, globalisation raises the question of transforming inter-nationalism (etymologically and historically a relation between nations, nationals and nationalities) into global solidarity. The latter is a movement and ethic identifying and addressing global social issues, identities and movements - including the national and ethnic. This means replacing the rhetorical internationalism of the nation-state period (when mass real-life experience was not universal and the universal was therefore unreal to masses) by one addressable and addressed to a world increasingly experienced by such masses of people - though differentially and unevenly - as both real and universal. A new universalism, both recognising and promoting plurality, must be based on a relational ontology, in which relating to others is not so much what we do as who we are. A monological ethic - in which universalistic principles dominate procedures - requires surpassing with a dialogical ethic, in which procedures allow for the possibility of developing a common discourse between different and unequal partners. 
 
 

Fifthly, globalisation, and the related collapse of both Communist and Radical-Nationalist alternatives to capitalism, helps us to understand that history does not consist of evolutionary stages (the higher, or later, the better), even less of binarily-opposed phases (civilised v. barbaric, modern v. traditional, post-modern v. modern). It is becoming increasingly possible to recognise that we are `living mixed times’ (Calderon 1994). It is this that allows the `primitive', `traditional', `barbarian', `pre-modern' Huarani indigenes of Amazonian Ecuador to pass messages to `modern' Netherlanders about a `post-modern' future.
 
 

The rest of this section considers the implications of such an understanding for global solidarity, communications/culture, citizenship, and the inter-relationship of the local and global, the middle class and popular classes, in the era of globalisation.
 
 

A complex solidarity for a complex globality
 
 

Globalisation creates a world that can increasingly be experienced as both real and universal, thus allowing for a universalism that is more than faith or obligation, a global solidarity that is more than a merely imagined community. The new global solidarity projects descend from, selectively re-articulate, allow for, but surpass, religious, liberal and socialist universalisms; proposing neither a return to an unchanging golden past nor a leap into a perfect future - here or hereafter - they allow for and require a dialogue of civilisations and ages, a solidarity with both past and future.
 
 

Here I will suggest an understanding of international solidarity that goes beyond both poetic and philosophical discourses, and any attempt at a one-word qualifier (`reciprocal', `reflexive'), but by building on rather than dismissing such. The understanding offered is a more political and a more complex one. It is also, I think, one that could aid research. Solidarity is here assumed to be: 1) informed by and positively articulated with equality, liberty, peace, tolerance, and more-recent emancipatory/life-protective ideals; 2) primarily a relationship between people and peoples, even where mediated by state, market and bureaucratic/hierarchical organisations; 3) an active process of negotiating differences, or creating identity (as distinguished from traditional notions of `solidarity as community' which may assume identity).
 
 

International solidarity - old or new, local or global, is here understood in terms of the acronym ISCRAR (an ironic mnemonic: Iskra was Lenin's newspaper). This spells out as Identity, Substitution, Complementarity, Reciprocity, Affinity and Restitution (see Figure 3):
 
 

Identity or identity creation is what commonly underlies socialist calls for international solidarity, usually in reference to oppressed and divided classes or categories in opposition to powerful and united oppressors (capitalists, imperialists). By itself, however, an Identity Solidarity can be reductionist and self-isolating, excluding unalikes. In so far as the identity is oppositional, it is a negative quality, often determined by the nature and project of the enemy or opponent (as with much traditional socialist internationalism);
 
 

Substitution implies standing up, or in, for a weaker or poorer other. This is how international solidarity has been usually understood amongst Development Cooperators and `First-World Third-Worldists'. By itself, however, a Substitution Solidarity can lead to substitutionism (acting and speaking for the other), and it can permit the reproduction of existing inequalities. This is a criticism of Development Cooperation, which may function to create a single community of guilt and moral superiority within `donor countries', whilst creating or reproducing further feelings of dependency and/or resentment in countries where social crises have evidently been worsening;
 
 

Complementarity suggests the provision of that which is missing, and therefore an exchange of different desired qualities. A Complementary Solidarity would mean that what was moving in each direction could differ but be equally valued by participants in the transaction. In so far as it meant that some kind of physical goods (cash, equipment, political support) were mostly moving in one direction and that some kind of moral or emotional goods (expressions of appreciation and gratitude) were mostly being received, we could be involved in an `unequal exchange' of a problematic character.
 
 

Reciprocity suggests mutual interchange, care, protection and support. It could be taken as the definition of the new global solidarity. Global Reciprocity Solidarity, however, could be understood as a principle of equal exchange, in which (as with states) one is exchanging political equivalents, or (as with capitalists) on the basis of calculated economic advantage. And it could therefore imply that one would defend the rights of others only if, or in expectation of, reciprocation by the other;
 
 

Affinity suggests mutual appreciation or attraction, and therefore a relationship of mutual respect and support, in which what is sought, appreciated or valued by each party is shared. Affinity would seem to have more to do with values, feelings and friendship. An Affinity Solidarity would seem to allow for global linkages within or between ideologies or movements, including between people without contact but acting in the same spirit. In so far as it approximates friendship, it would seem to be inevitably particular, if not particularistic;
 
 

Restitution suggests the putting right of a past wrong, the recognition of historical responsibility, a `solidarity with the past', a solidarity across time rather than space. This comes close to inter-governmental war reparations, with the consequent danger of buying off guilt.
 
 

The value of such an understanding would seem to be the following: 1) that it is multi-faceted and complex; 2) that each type holds part of the meaning and that each is only part of the meaning; 3) that it is subversive of simple binary or (r)evolutionary oppositions between bad and good, old and new, material and moral solidarity; 4) that it enables critique of partial or one-sided solidarities; 5) that it could be developed into a research instrument, permitting, for example, surveys of the meaning(s) of solidarity for those involved.
 
 

From aspect to essence: global solidarity as communication
 
 

An exemplar - or at least an example - of alternative social movements operating under the conditions of an informatised and globalised capitalism, that of women is, at least implicitly, a communications internationalism. This has several different but interconnected meanings. The first is that it operates in the sphere of ideas, information and images, revealing that which is globally concealed, suggesting new meanings for that which is revealed. The second and consequent one is that, like other such, it is particularly active and effective on the terrain of communication, media, culture. The third is that, again like other such, its basic relational principle is that of the network rather than the organisation. The fourth, and consequent, one is that the movement needs to be primarily understood in communicational/cultural rather than in the traditional political/organisational terms.
 
 

The global sphere of ideas, information and images. There is nothing immaterial, superstructural or derivative about this sphere, although in the industrial phase of capitalism it may have appeared as all three. We do not, at the other extreme, need to become discourse-determinists to recognise both the increasing centrality of this sphere and the potential for emancipatory movement and radical democracy it contains. That this sphere is created and dominated by the logic of capital cannot conceal its contradictory nature: capital, capitalists, capitalisms, cannot simply control this sphere in the way they did the factory, the family, the state, the school and the gun. This is also a non-territorial sphere, meaning one increasingly capable of that expanding growth, flexibility and democratisation that the capitalism of industry and the state-nation has promised/denied. It is growth here that will make an ecological steady-state possible globally, without such `conservatism' implying stagnation or reaction. The problem to be overcome is that of the invisibility of this sphere: that it is either transparent to emancipatory movements, or else handled with concepts and understandings borrowed from, for example, politics.
 
 

The global terrain of communication, media, culture. At national level, or within a nation-state-dominated discourse, we can recognise as distinct, overlapping and mutually-informing cultural spheres, the Dominant, the Popular and the Alternative. But, the Popular (in so far as this implies places actively and intensively lived in and culturally shaped by poorer population sectors) can hardly be said to have a place or space at global level. The Popular is here carried, shaped and articulated by either the immensely powerful Dominant global means or the still tiny and marginal Alternative ones - which are in mutual dispute for hegemony over the Popular. The marginality of the Alternative is less important for social movements than recognition of: 1) the creative freedom permitted by such marginality; 2) the name and increasing centrality of this terrain; 3) the necessity and possibility of disputing it. It has been argued, in relation to its democratic potential, that cyberspace is less like a hammer (a means, a tool, for doing something to something) than Germany (a place, space, culture). It is, actually, a hammer and Germany and Utopia (`nowhere', `a good place', a community yet to be imagined and created). Globally it is a space of increasingly public dispute, as radical-democratic social movements mobilise for `A People's Communication Charter' and related political transformations. These, and other such projects, both require and are creating democratic and pluralist global communication networks that are increasingly specialised and professional.
 
 

Networking as a principle of global inter-relationship. Networking is both the oldest and the most common form of human social relationship. It was only with the development of industrial and state-national capitalism that the formal, hierarchical organisation (authoritarian, representative-democratic, participatory-democratic) came to impose itself, to suck power and meaning out of such networks, to concentrate all decision-making power within itself, to project itself as both the real and ideal relational form. The transformation to a globalised and informatised capitalism brings back the networking principle with a vengeance - primarily vengeance against those subaltern strata now locked into and dependent on the traditional hierarchical organisation! There is, thus, nothing essentially virtuous about networking either now or in the recent (or, for that matter, pre-capitalist) past. 
 
 

In talking of networking however, we are considering human inter-relationships, including those within and between organisations, in communication terms. In so far as networks are conceived of as horizontal, flexible, incorporating participation and feedback, we can also value these over the rigid hierarchical organisation, and attempt to thus distinguish `our' networks from `their' networks. We have, however, also to recognise that within any particular political domain - geographical, social, professional - networking does not only mean an informal and flexible horizontal relationship between equals and alikes, but also informal vertical relationships between such, and informal horizontal relations between unequals and unalikes.
 
 

Networks also have different architectures, such as the star, the wheel and the web (including a World Wide Web increasingly used by social movements and activist academics) implying differential influence and control. Network-babble therefore needs, today, to be replaced by network analysis, including consideration of roles within, or in relation to, them, of the cost of individual/group involvement, of the extent of their connectivity, of their density, and of the role of opinion leaders (who can evidently convert a network into a `following').
 
 

All these complexities and qualifications notwithstanding, the idea, value and practice of networking opens wide perspectives to emancipatory global movements, previously (self-) condemned to reproduce the pyramidical and hierarchical structure of the corporation, factory, state, army, prison, church or (Godess forbid!) university. Indeed, the archetypical political party of liberal democracy was invented by the German labour and socialist movement, in its early, emancipatory moment: it was criticised almost one century ago for its creation and reproduction of oligarchy. If the extreme form of emancipatory internationalism was at one time represented by the Comintern (combining characteristics of an early Christian sect, the Jesuit order, the Islamic jihad, and the state foreign intelligence or spy ring), the new ideal must be the Italian one of the `biodegradable organisation' (an ideal activists are more likely to welcome in general theory than in particular effect or as promoted practice).
 
 

From national subjects to global citizens: insiders without outsiders
 
 

The notion of global citizenship has at least two inter-related problems attached to it. The first is that of the social, territorial inclusion/exclusion anchored historically in the concept of rights/responsibilities within a city (later state-nation). The second is its relationship to a sovereign power, whether aristocratic, monarchical or republican). A global citizenship would be one without outsiders, unless we are thinking of extra-terrestrial territories or beings. It would also be one recognising that, today more than ever, `sovereign power' at global level is complex and dispersed. Yet, given globalisation, some such notion seems not only inescapable but also attractive.
 
 

The idea of global citizenship is a logical implication of theoretical and political discussion of multi-tiered citizenship, itself a result of the creation of such regional polities as the European Union, and of a relativisation of state-nation centrality. It is attractive for numerous reasons. One is shown by the way in which women have been able to successfully appeal to the European Court of Justice against the state-nation. Another attraction is that of embodying universal rights and responsibilities in people and peoples rather than the state-nation.
 
 

The non-existence of a recognisable global sovereign is less an obstacle than a challenge to emancipatory global movements. That there is no single address for the People's Communication Charter or the Cultural Environment Movement, does not prevent them from seeking for and identifying the places where power is concentrated, nor from pressing for citizen-like rights - and responsibilities - in this sphere. In this case, perhaps, global-citizens-in-the-making might be also creating a global sovereignty (subject to both perestroika and glasnost) over an increasingly privatised sphere that is monopolistic in tendency, individualising, intrusive and destructive of human sociality and creativity.
 
 

The concept of the world citizen appropriate to the era of globalisation can no longer be that of the religious universalist, the liberal cosmopolitan or the socialist internationalist. Ecological theory has already begun to conceptualise the matter, identifying as hypothetical global citizens 1) the global capitalist, 2) the global reformer, 3) the environmental manager and 4) the earth citizen. The earth citizen is one with an attitude of care for and cooperation with her/his environment.
 
 

Notions of `cosmopolitan democracy', and extensive related discussion, sensitise us to the growing importance of international institutions - and the impact that these have on notions of democracy that assume the sovereign nation-state. They may, however, be based on an over-optimistic projection forward from the 1990s wave of UN activity, and of the NGO/civil society role in global conferences. We do not know, at this uncertain moment, what US or other major state/bloc interest there is in anything more than a slimmed-down set of such institutions, with serious global decision-making confined to smaller and more-secretive clubs - with carefully-selected, purely-decorative, NGO `consultative committees' as a cheap but decorative fringe.
 
 

Discussion around global institutions in terms of democracy has nonetheless extended the notion of `double democratisation' - of both state and civil society - to the global level. If this kind of discussion often makes a simple identification of the latter with the new alternative social movements or NGOs, critical reflection on the latter suggests the necessity for a third democratisation - of full citizenship within a sphere that often reproduces the hierarchy, secrecy and competitivity of capital, state, and of those old bureaucratised labour or socialist movements over which superiority is claimed.
 
 

5. Conclusion: some implications for (would-be) internationalists
 
 

If, at the beginning of the century, it was more or less clear which space was national and which international, which local and which global, at the end this is no longer so. If I reflect on International Women's Day 1997 at my own institute, it is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish the global and the local. Women students, from the Women and Development Programme, brought this into the institute with the local version of a global campaign against sexual harassment. A public meeting made apparent that the institute was, in its procedures, failing to recognise the structured inequality between harassers (male) and harassed (female). Further revealed was a locally-, nationally- or regionally-specific combination of liberal-patriarchal assumption and liberal-democratic intention. This institute is a Dutch, state-dependent, internationally-staffed and Third-World-oriented institute of Westernised development studies. The students are primarily from the Third World (i.e. two-thirds of our globalised whole). A number of them are feminists, formed not only by local struggles and feminists but also by First-World and even First-Worldist feminisms - as well as by such global feminism as was articulated at the 4th World Conference on Women in Beijing (where 30-40 past institute graduates met each other and present staff). Where, in this case, is the global and where the local? Which is influencing which? And, in this struggle for a citizenship recognising and allowing for difference, where does feminist power and initiative originate, lie or accumulate? The institute is not, of course, local in the way of...where? Chiapas in the Deep South of Mexico? Its inhabitants are not localised like...who? The white male dockers of Liverpool in the North-West of England? Both communities are involved in conflicts caused by neo-liberal globalisation, and one can learn about and support the struggles of their men and women through internationally accessible alternative media and the Internet. Through the World Wide Web they are not only part of but contributing to a worldwide web of solidarity. It therefore occurs to me that, as global and local movements increasingly interpentrate and inform each other, we possibly need to concentrate less on places or levels than processes and flows.
 
 

Another thought. What we have been talking about here is `globalisation from below' only in a rhetorical sense (although one could ask, rhetorically, do we not need a new radical-democratic global rhetoric?). The active agents of the new global solidarity are mostly - like those actually accessing, entering and downloading from the Internet - tertiary-educated middle-class professionals, academics and technicians. This is not a matter for concealment or even embarassment. Most 19th and early-20th century bearers of labour and socialist internationalism were either middle class or - through their activity as (semi-)professional internationalists - became so. It is worth remembering that in 1914 it was not so much the `labour bureaucracy' or `labour aristocracy' that betrayed the working class but the national and nationalist working classes that `betrayed' their commonly internationalist leaders! This was a traumatic and formative experience in international social movement history that does not bear repetition. The new internationalists need to unite not only with each other but with their respective publics, constituencies, masses.
 
 

Yet another thought. There is a belief, or at least a wish, in the international labour and socialist movement, as well as amongst some left social theorists, that it might be possible to return to, or revive, the liberal-democratic national welfare state of the post 1945 era, or its socialist-nationalist opposite number, or their international projection in the UN institutions. This is to ignore the historical evidence: anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist revolutions can be reversed, or at least vitiated; the revolutions of or inside capitalism - industrial, informational - can not, or have not. It is also to fail to consider how the Keynesian national(ist) welfare model, in curious duplication of its national-communist competitor, disarmed social movements and civil society, thus permitting, if not preparing the way, for national and global neo-liberalism.
 
 

The fate of the reports of successive international commissions of the great and the good, Brandt, Brundtland and Our Global Neighbourhood (I may have missed one or two) do not augur well for such attempts to regain the Paradigm Lost. They have been joined, in the dustbin of global reformist utopianism, by the 1970s-80s projects (promoted by leftist politicians and academics, and endorsed by authoritarian Thirdworld and Communist states) for the New World This That and The Other Order. Yet it seems impossible that some convincing statist and reformist project for taming or civilising global casino capitalism will not develop over the next decade! The books mentioned in my introduction above either prefer this or stimulate such. The new alternative global social movements should certainly support such, but they should neither identify themselves with nor subordinate themselves to them. What, it seems to me, they should be doing is thinking about the kind of world, the kind of state, the kind of nation, the kind of welfare desirable, necessary and possible under conditions of globalisation.
 
 

This kind of thinking, strategising and even acting is, finally, beginning to take shape within the labour movement internationally, or at least on the advanced fringes of the international labour organisations. These first green shoots of an alternative global labour solidarity movement challenge the assumptions of people like Castells and Harvey that the labour movement has no reach beyond the (inter)national, no message for the future. In their own efforts to produce a historical and dialectical account of social protest and transformation, they have forgotten to allow that labour could be re-educated, or re-educate itself, as a result of its experience of globalisation and of other movements against such! Certain national and international trade union organisations, certain international trade union officers, are beginning to rise from a formerly suppine position, robustly attacking neo-liberal globalisation, addressing themselves also to the new global issues (gender, human rights, environment, peace), and even learning from the networking principles and communication/cultural strategies of the new global social movements. Whilst it is true that they tend to refer to these movements institutionally (as NGOs), narrowly (as single-issue movements) and in liberal-democratic terms (as non-representative), they are beginning to dialogue with such and even to share platforms with them. Even more significant is the new way they are beginning to understand labour, now expanded beyond the mythical male bread-winner to include the lot of women, children, the sub-contracted, the self-employed, the temporary and part-time. These international labour organisations and initiatives are attempts to re-invent an international and internationalist labour movement fit for a globalised, informatised and networked capitalism. Emblematic here is the Summit of the Peoples of the Americas, held alongside the Second Summit of the Americas, Santiago, Chile, April 15-19, 1998. This was apparently an initiative of the Regional Organisation of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the Organizacion Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores. Whether or not this was the case, it was certainly both supported and attended by the `unusual suspects’ of today rather than the usual ones of yesterday - by women’s and feminist organisations, by human rights and anti-NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) and anti-FTAA (Free Trade Area of the Americas) campaigners. The major general and union documents coming out of this conference may tend to remain within the limits - or on the front edge - of a global neo-keynesianism. But the more radical of the two documents coming out of the women’s panel made a much more critical analysis and took a forcefully anti-patriarchal/capitalist stand. The eventual integration of a radical internationalist feminism with a revived international unionism could make a powerfully subversive mixture. The very presence of such a radical view at a union-sponsored international event augurs well for the future.
 
 

David Harvey was right about modern social movements having their strength in local places rather than globalised spaces, at least up till - say - the 1970s. But his conclusion would be a disastrous guide to the present or future. `Think globally and act locally'? How the world, and perceptions of it, have changed! We cannot today repeat the slogans of the 1960s, when globalisation was a problem without a name and global solidarity was still called internationalism. The revolutionary slogan for the next century has already been invented: `Think globally, act locally; think locally, act globally'. This slogan, however, still suggests these are two distinct and opposed spheres. I have rather suggested that they are interpenetrating and mutually influential. To this slogan I would therefore like to add: `Think dialectically: act self-reflexively'. This is, after all, also an epoch in which survival demands 1) the replacement of binary by dialectical thinking, 2) a recognition that relating to (distant) others is not what we do but who we are, 3) that, particularly when we are attempting to universalise, we make ourselves and our `subject position' visible and ourselves available to the reader, inviting and encouraging her/him to see us as part of an inevitably partial and particular contribution to a new kind of internationalism. The ambition of this paper, certainly, reaches no further.
 
 

References and additional bibliography in English and Spanish
 
 

1. Documents
 
 

Figure 1: Globalisation, its discontents, movements and alternatives
 
 
 

Figure 3: The meanings of international solidarity
 
 
 

[Peter Waterman, who retired from the Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, in 1998, is author of Globalization, Social Movements and the New Internationalisms (Mansell, London and New York, 1998) and co-editor of Labor Worldwide in the Era of Globalization: Alternatives for Unions in the New World Order (Macmillan, London and St Martin's New York, 1999).